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INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem 
The attempt will be made to give an accurate account 
of the fundamental principles . of Hart·shorne' s theory of 
God's relation to the individual. The specific problem 
will cepter on an analysis of the cognitive-causal and 
ethical-esthetic etructure .of the divine relationship. This 
will include particular attention to the basic analogical 
grounds upon which Hartshorne endeavors to develop an 
empirically and l .ogically coherent social concept of God. 
Consideration of the analogies will in turn require an 
adequa.te .examination of both the mind-body and social 
relations, in which the individual functions as a unitary 
self in relation to his body, and in relation to other 
individuals. A general description of the physic-neural 
a pparatus of cognition and control, together with a 
description of the nature of inter-personal.eommunication, 
will provide an analogical basis for formulating an 
empirical theory of divine omniscience, volition, and social 
participation. 
In understanding the ethical-esthetic aspect of the 
divine relation, attention vdll be concentrated upon the 
concept of love, motivation, and creativity on the human 
scale, as preliminary to understanding the nature of love, 
Vi 
motivation, and creativity on the divine scale. 
On the cognitive-causal side of God's relation to man, 
Hartshorne ·will show how God is aware of the universe and 
all of its particular existents, and how God causally 
interacts with that universe. On the ethical-esthetic 
side, Hartshorne will describe the quality of God's concern 
for the universe and all of its particular existents, and 
show how that concern--which is love--constitutes the 
unity, amidst multiplicity, of the cosmic order. 
Hartshorne develops his theory of the divine relativity 
in accordance with the view of panpsychism. Hence the 
orientation .of the entire analysis .. roots -in the principle 
of feeling, of sympathy, which is basic in that view. The 
notion of the "feeling of feeling" is the fundamentally 
explanatory principle of cognition, causality, love and 
creativity. 
vii 
2. The Method 
The fundamental material for this · thesis is found in 
Hartshorne's three · main texts, 1 in which the major 
arguments for a "surrelative" conception of God are 
developed. The exposition of his view has been developed 
on the basis .of a close, comparative study of the three 
volumes. And in the analysis of the texts, notations have 
been made of technical elaborations and supplementary 
arguments appearing, especially, in his last work. These 
texts serve as a nucleus, and other material has been brought 
in and incorporated into the structure of the thesis. The 
selection of supplementary material was judged on the basis 
of further clarity that could be introduced into the 
exposition by such material, their relevant technical content, 
and their usefulness in .making .necessary elaborations of 
special concepts not directly related to the main problem. 
In reference to the section on critical analysis, 
another body of material was used relevant to the particular 
criticism presented of Hartshorne's view. 
The plan of the thesis consists of a preliminary 
analysis of' panpsychism and its doctrine of feeling and 
1. Beyond Humanism--BH, . J\;1an' s Vision of God--MVG, 
The Divine Re,ativity--TDR. 
See Bibliography for explanation of all abbreviations 
used in this thesis. 
viii 
organic sympathy. This will be followed by an examination 
of the analogies which provide the empirical grounds for 
the consideration of the main problem, the treatment of the 
main problem, and the critical analysis. 
ix 
Previous Work 
This thesis is . the outcome of a careful revision and 
extensive elaboration of a term paper previously submitted 
in a seminar on American .Philosophy. The background of 
this work extends, . of course, beyond the term paper, 
extending over the fifteen two-hour sessions during which 
the writer and other members of this seminar, under the 
competent direction of Professor Bertocci and the frequent 
assistance of Mr. Gerlach, engaged in a step by step study 
of Hartsho.rne' s bas.ic arguments, as these appeared in his 
Man's Vision of God and The Divine Relativity. The closer 
acquaintance with some of the :fine points of Hartshorne's 
theory resulting from this semester study, provided a broad 
basis upon which .further and more exhaustive study could 
be made in the two . texts, and the earlier one, Beyond 
Humanism, together with other related materials. 
Outside of Hartshorne's own work, no other studies 
specific.ally relating to the problem of this thesis have 
been made. Reviews and articles appearing in various 
philosophical journals contain the only attempts made thus 
far to understB:Dd and elaborate Hartshorne's "surrelative" 
conception of God. 
X 
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CHAPTER I 
PANPSYCHISM: FEELING AND ORGANIC SYMPATHY 
1. The Panpsychistic Alternative to Dualism 
The extreme materialistic view that all activity is 
non-sentient and non-purposive is so completely at odds 
with man.' s . common experience as to require no elaborate 
refutation. Its very defense entails self-contradiction, 
since it assumes a purpose in rejecting purpose. The more 
sensible alternative to this viewis the one which defines 
some activity as sentient and purposive, and other 
activity as not. This dualistic view, growing out of the 
historical bifurcationof nature into the organic and in-
organic, has not only beenwide1y accepted in traditional 
thought, but finds . general acceptance · in contemporary 
circles . as an adequat.e modifi.cation of extreme materialism. 
The view, however, has thrived more on simply common sense 
observations than on scientific inquiriesinto nature. 
Its validity, therefore, is to be judged in terms of the 
source from which it derives its .support. The knowledge 
of' common sense i s extreme.ly superficial, conf'ined as it 
is to the immediately observable, surface aspects of 
natural phenomena. vlliere common sense has seen only rigid, 
lifeless organizations of matter, science has uncovered 
vast and intricate microcosmic systems of activity, having 
1 
spatial dimensions measurable only in terms of the calculus. 
But science in a methodological sense has been 
responsible for maintaining a sharp dualism between living 
and non-living wholes. With the complete alienation of 
mind from the realm of nature, effected through basic 
changes , in outl.ook contained in the new conceptual 
apparatus .of science, dualism \vas given its most decisive 
and comprehensive recognit.i .on. The world of nature became 
simply a concat.enation cif event-s. in temporal sequence . and 
spatial. conjunctions. No mind was. resident . therein. And 
sharply contrasting with this was the realm of man's ex-
perience--the dualism , betwe.en purposive, conative life, 
and purposeless., mechanical .process. Nature thus became 
a set of phenomena .describable in differential equations. 
In the words .of Professor G. P. Adams: 
structures, functional correlations, and variations become 
the categories. ,in terms of which nature is to be understoo.d 
and mastered." 1 In this shift of basic concepts, the 
"observer's perspective" replaced the "animistic 
perspective." 2 This meant that perception was now defined 
1. Adams, MAM, 85. 
2. These terms are used by Professor Adams to mark out 
precisely that area over which mind as .disinterested 
s.pectator operates, as contrasted with the domain over 
which mind as active cognition o.perates. The first 
refers to observation of events in the phenomenal 
manif'old, and their tran.scription into mathematical 
as a mediate relation of observer to object, a relat,ion in 
which the objectwas entirely independent of and numerically 
distinct from the percipient .. 
The .appearance of :t'undamen:tal modi.fications in the 
conceptual apparatus of phJsics.,--such as the. indeterminacy 
principle in quantum mechanics, and the substitution of 
rectilinear for wavilinear_ models--created fresh possibili-
ties for new phil.osophic and . scientific interpretations. 
If the inorganic and geometrically fixed world of 
Newtonian . science was found actually to contain vast 
amounts of activity, and .activity of the . non-geom.etrical 
nature found in the "jumping electronu, then in these die-
closures of discontinuity, novelty, and fluid shifts in 
structure, there were to be found important analogies 
between human behavior and the behavior of non-human 
entities. The new physics, of course, is of more 
immediate importance in its undercutting the dualistic 
metaphysics of nature, and hence the bas.ic division be-
tween living and non-living wholes. But, at the same 
time, it readily opens many avenues of inquiry which 
directly lead to a notation of the analogical similarities 
between the activities of human and non-human beings. 
formulae, for purposes of prediction and control. The 
second refers to cognitive activities in which insight, 
synthesis, and trans-empirical evaluation take place. 
I 
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Another important development opposing dualism's 
treatment of perception is taking place in esthetics. 
Modern esthetic analysis is showing that perceptual ex-
perience is not. simply practical cognition o.r abstract 
intellection, but in addition, sympathetic response. In 
one's ·esthetic perceptions, characterized by such sym-
pathetic response, the esthetic object appears to take 
on an added quality, thatof being alive--there is an 
intuitive sense of ''feeling meeting feeling" as obtaining 
between individual and ob.ject. The notion that perception 
is simply an objective, detached (external) relation of 
observer to object. is thereby revised to include a. larger 
and more adequate description: Perception may on one 
cognitive level be simply this obje.ctive relation, but it 
may also on another level, i.e., the esthetic, function 
within a network of sympathetic relations. 
Clearly, in light of thes.e and many other revisions, 
Hartshorne believes dualism cannot be accepted. Now there 
is an alternative to dualism that proves much more 
satisfactory in its explanation of mind and matter and 
their mutual relations (as especially found in the mind-body 
situation), and includes a much more metaphysically in-
c l usive, empirically grounded view of nature. This 
alternative is to be found in panpsychism. 
The current scientific climate provides optimum 
4 
condi tiona under which a panpsychistic philosophy may 
flourish and achieve maturity.. The various opposing trends 
to dualism contain the reasons for this: (1) The new 
physics in activating the inorganic is setting the grounds 
:for a new metaphysics of continuous being. Its observation 
that the constituents of non-living wholes are not 
crystallized bits of mat.ter but . are actually functions on 
f determinate--and indeterminate--scales of activity, is 
creating a scientificatmosphere most compatible with the 
development of a panpsychistic metaphysics. Th.e emphasis 
of panpsychism on activity and some trne of reactive 
sentiency in all strata of life finds initially fruitful 
support in the new physics. (2) Recent esthetic analysis 
on the sympathetic nature of perception. directly corro-
borates panpsychism 's fundamental principle, that relations 
between individuals (using "individuals" to cover all 
independent objects) are partly of an internal nature. 
Man does not simply observe a man, or a physical object, 
or event. He in some sense enters into that to which he 
is related, as a perception of the i .nternal disposition of 
the man, object or event. Primitive man saw mind in the 
outer stretches of nature, revealing a natural persuasion 
to experience sympathetically. In the case of primitive 
man's animism it led to crude and extreme obse.rvations. 
Thus, Hartshorne comes to this conclusion about 
panpsychism: 
5 
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This interpretation leaves physical science intact, I 
I explains primitive and esthetic experience, and is the I 
only view which does not •••• set limits, in advance I 
of future scienti.fic discoveries, to the intelligibility 1 
of t hings, and thus 'barricade the road of inquiry.' 1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
' 
1. Hartshorne, BH, 167-68. 
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2. The Category of Feeling and the 
Problem of Mind and Matter 
Some careful observations must be made regarding the 
category of feeling. In panpsychism every constituent 
of living and non-living wholes is conceived to possess 
some ingredient of sentiency. But from thi.s general 
statement particular inferences must be made with caution. 
To say that an entity feels is not to describe how it 
feels, nor, in addition, to conclude that human feelings 
must be exactly duplicated, for instance, in animal or 
"electronic" feelings. There is good reason to believe 
that there are radical differences in feeling-quality and 
certainly in feeling-capacity among the various strata of 
life. 
Now panpsychism, the alternative to dualism, does not 
insist that 'mind' has no degrees and must be present 
if at all in unlimited fashion. • • .panpsychism 
insists always1upon the graduated or relative character of mentality. 
A protozoon or electron m,ay be mindless and purposeless 
for all practical purposes, but panpsychism asserts that 
these small units at least contain in some ultra-microscopic 
mea sure those psychic tendencies which in human beings 
reach the height of awareness and purpose. 
1. BH, 134. 
I 
il 
A societal concept of the cosmos can become highly 
intelligible if one grants that mentality is not to be 
conceived uniformly on all levels of existence, but as 
. gradua tive, increasing from an absolute minimum (e. g . a 
photon) to an absolute maximum (deity). A universe com-
posed of aggregates of higher-type individuals (higher-type 
minds) and aggregates of lower-type individuals (10\'Ter-type 
minds) deployed. on a scale of subordination can be nothing 
else but a c.osmic-size society. The lowest individual 
would be a "disembodied soul, 11 a being so inferior that no 
other being would be subservient to it,l and yet it would 
possess some residual reactivity to its immediate environ-
ment. "The extremely orderly charac t er of the inanimate 
physical world is due •••• partly to this meagerness of 
the lo,1est souls." 2 Cosmic order is possible in light 
of the fact that. the world of lower-type minds is enslaved 
to the t1orld of higher-type minds. 
Feeling is the reality-principle of panpsychism. The 
individual feelshis own feelings, which is the experience 
of self, and feels the feelings of other individuals, which 
is the experience of "other." 3 "The social character of 
1. BH, 171. 
2. BH, 171. 
3. See Chapter 3 for further explanation of ''feeling . of 
feeling," in terms of Whitehead's principle of "prehen-
sion." 
8 
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feeling may be the meaning of the subject-object relation." 
The dualism of mind and matter is here dissolved. 
Matter is not some insensi.tive "stuff" hanging out in space, 
and mind some qualitatively different "knower" that intuits 
this reality. Mind and matter are simply varying aspects 
of feeling. Matter may be distinguished from mind in the 
degree of awareness it possesses. Awareness on the mental 
level is more vivid, more inclusive, than awareness on the 
"material" level. Actually the contrast is between mind 
and mind, as between mind as ~eeling and mind as meaning , 
or between mind as suffering and enjoying, and mind as the 
user of signs. The dualism between a · subject-mind and an 
object-matter is replaced by a contrast between one mind-
self and another mind-self. The dynamism of all inter-
acti.on between individuals is describable as feeling 
socially interlocking with feeling. 2 
Form is feeling in . specific categories--esthetic, 
moral, intellectual. "Feel.ing is the 'matter' of esthetic, 
moral, and intellectual form-giving; and all form-giving as 
directly experienced is esthetic, moral or intellectual. t• 3 
1. BH, 172. 
2. In panpsychism interaction between individuals is multi-
relational: Interaction between living wholes, between 
living wholes and the constituents of non-living wholes, 
between the constituents themselves of both non-living 
and living wholes, or between the constituents of one 
living whole with another living whole. 
3. BH, 173. 
9 
3 • Ore;ani c Sympathy and the 
:Mind-Body Relation 
The mind-body rela.tion is a general topic under which 
several closely related problems are logically subsumed. 
The subsumed problems are: The subject-object relation, 
the causal order in nature, the nature of time, the nature 
of individuality, and knowledge of others. Hartshorne 
believes to have a common solution for both the general 
problem and the five related problems. And this solution 
is titled 11organic. sympathy .• ,. 
The subject-object relation has already been ex-
plicated in terms of the .category o.f feeling. The relation 
of mind to material object is translated into. the relation 
of one feeling-self to another feeling-self. The relation, 
of course, may not entail uniform reciprocity of awareness, 
since if the relation is between a human mind and a dog, 
for instance, the threshold of awareness of ·one would be 
extremely larger than of the other. Granting the existence 
of radical differentials in the span of awareness between 
given units, the relation is still one of juxtaposed 
mentalities. The relation is genuinely symmetrical, 
qualitatively speaking, since both terms of the relation 
a.re complexes of feeling. 'lt.'hereas in the dualistic view, 
the relation between subject and object is one of a 
conscious self and an opaque, insensitive item 11 out there"-- I 
I 
10 
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I 
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a qualitatively asymmetrical relation. 
The term "awareness" simply refers to the extensity 
of feeling. A human mind has much larger awareness of 
events in reality than a dog's mind, which is to say that 
its range of feeling is much wider than the dog's. 
Relations conceived inthese terms are social, which is 
to assert that they are a direct instance of sympathy. To 
sympathize is "to feel, to struggle with, and to mean 
that which itself. feels, etrug{3les, and means .• tt 1 
The "othern with which human minds sympathize is 
other minds or other things. Communication is carried on 
indirectly, through medium of eigne. This is one 
qualification important for understanding the status of 
individuality in an environment of feeling-relations. 
Communication is sympathetic, represented in a bond of 
intuitive feeling, but itdoes not dissolve individuality 
in the . sense. of interpenetrating the private c.enter of 
feelings of a self. Communication is a proces.e by which 
one self through certain signs experiences that feeling 
which that self ana-logously interpolates to be the feeling 
2 of another self. Individuality, of course, is more than 
simple qualitative non-penetrability in a social-sympathetic 
relation. Hartshorne states: "The experience which each 
1. BH, 195-96. 
2. This is fUrther developed in Chapter 2. 
i 
I 
~ 11 
of us has of the unity and individuality of himself, or of 
'his' experiences as his, is the very basis of our idea of' 
individuality." 1 Hence individuality is a function of 
self-recognition. Each individual unit is unique and 
entirely distinguishable from every other individual unit 
by virtue of the continuous reflexive consciousness of 
self as distinctly itself and not any other self. 
Communication between minds is sympathetically not 
intuitively direct since the freedom and uniqueness of the 
individual would be destroyeq, if it were. This does not 
deny sympathetic interdependence of individuals, such 
which is quite a central fact--and necessity--of societal 
experience. But it is not the drastic interdependence 
which occurs between parts in a single living whole. 
11 Compl.ex minds like ours derive their complex content from 
inferior minds through a relation of partial dependence upon 
them, i.e., upon the units composing their bodies.'' 2 
Human minds may be conceived as acting directly on their 
bodily components and the bodily components in turn acting 
upon human minds. But a.s the human mind exerts a unitary 
control over the body, and the bodily parts exert only 
partial influence, the advantage is always with the human 
1. BH, 146. 
2. BH, 197. 
12 
being. 1 
But there are concrete instances in the individual's 
internal ltfe scheme in which direct sympathy does operate. 
In memory, the individual directly experiences a complex 
· mind, that is, his past self as influencing the present 
self. Here there are two selves contained within one 
self, and .the relation between them is. of a highly 
immediat.e, sympathetic character. Also, in conflict 
situationsthere is a self set off from a self, yet both 
selves are recognized as functions of one self. This is 
directly illustrated in a self's experience of pain. \\'hen 
an individual determines to resist a physical pain, there 
is present a spatial contrast .between the individual's 
self and the pain located somewhere in hie body. The pain 
is a part of the individual and .yet invoives some other 
agency, or the individual would have no reason to exert 
cons.cious resistance. Here, as in memory situations, there 
is direct qualitative interpenetration of minds. But not 
complete int.erpenetration, not complete inclusion of self 
in the .cells, which is evident in the vagueness of our 
feelings of the afflicted cells . "That we do not distinctly 
feel the separate selves whose superiority to subhuman 
1. See Chapter 2 on a further elaboration . o~ the mind-body 
function. Also, note the description of Hartshorne's 
epistemological distinction between the 11representativet' 
and 11presentative 11 function of sensation. 
13 
selves is attained at a price.n 1 And in a conflict 
experience there is present the realization that the 
sympathetic interdependence of a higher complex mind (the 
human mind) with lower minds. entails suffering. 
Thus the problems of the subject-object relation, 
individuality and knO'\'Tledge of other minds seem initially 
soluble in terms of the soluti.on that is offered in the 
principle of norgani.c sympathy." Sympathy renders inter-
action in a subject-object relation intelligible, yet it 
preserves the individuality of units in a societal system, 
and offers an explanation of the manner in which knowledge 
2 may be possessed of other minds. 
1. BH, 198. 
2. This discussion is taken up at length in Chapter 2, and 
in reference to the God-man relation, in Chapter 3· 
1. 
/I 
I 
I 
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CHAPTER II 
THE FUNDAl"\fENTAL ANALOGICAL SCHEME 
1. The Mind-Body Construct 
The mind.-body relation has two major characteristics 
which distinguish it from other rela tional types, such as 
the relation between minds or between a mind and another 
body. These characteristics are (a) the quality of 
immediate awareness which . the individual has of his bodily 
processes--the cognitive "feel" of one's emotional and 
physiological states; (b) the specific range of control 
which the individual possess.es over his thoughts and 
actions, as particularly relating to the initial phase of 
effective movement, that is, volition altering nerve tissues J 
The human body is conceived as an individual totality 
of .inter-functioning units, with mind as a unitary conscious 
process encompassing, though not in every instance control-
ling, all the individual functions of the body . The body 
is a "world" of i ndividuals, and the mind holds relation 
to that body 1n a way that suggests an indwelling God. 
The unification of mind with body composes the unique 
individuality which is attributed to each individual. But 
it is an individuality .that is constituted by,and yet in 
virtue of its center in mind, remains distinct from all of 
the microscopicconstituents that belong to that particular 
,/ 
I 
'I I 
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bodily structure-. 
The individual has direct control only in those highly 
part1cular ·vol1tional situations in which there is a direct 
impact of will upon neural · structures. The · action of 
human will on the neural mechanism op.erates in terms of a 
series of electro-chemical tensions set off by the initial 
impress .of will, which in an extended process of complex 
energy transactions .result in effective muscular movement. 
I . The "break n between will and the nervous mechanism can be 
bridged only through the direct, unmediated effort of the 
willing agent. ''By the nervous mechanism man controls 
other things; but there is no further mechanism bet\'leen 
his w.ill and the nerves themselves." 1 
The entire nervous system is the vehicle of the will 
through whose direct impress the individual can communicate 
and materialize his purposes and decisions. Muscular 
activity in its part.icu.lar forms is the final event in a 
long s.eries of pSff;:hophysical events involving a purposive 
mental set, volition, neural changes, and muscular move-
menta. 
Human thought and volit.ion are focused on the body in 
its whole aspect, rather than on its parts. The body A.s 
a whole, that is, the mind, wills, and the parts of the 
body respond. fi~us there is a plurality of individual and 
1. Hartshorne, MVG, 179. 
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unitary movements: The mind-volitional process operates in 
terms of an awareness of the body as a unitary whole, but 
the precise neuromusculature changes combine into distinct 
movements involving only part o:f the body, B.rld result in 
unitary response in particular forms of activity. 
The individual's immediate awareness lies with the 
indub.itable contents of his perceptual field, which convey 
more distinct and immediate information about his internal 
physiological states than about external conditions. Ii' 
a certainchange takes place in a part of the body, the 
change will almost immediately register in the brain and 
impinge upon one's consciousness, given the proper 
conditions. The change may not. be highly particularized 
in the resulting content of consciousness, i.e., revealing 
in det.ail the actual cells involved in the change, but the 
individual's awareness is adequate enough for him to 
re.cognize that the change, for example, indicates some 
mal-functioning factor in his body. The individual may be 
indubitably assured of the · correctness. of the percepts in 
his immediatef'ield of awareness--i.e., the phenomenal 
content of s.ensation--although the individual cannot 
without recours.e to inference and extended observation 
know for certain the status of their ontological 
re.f'erents, and even this latter phase of verifying 
knowledge particulars is open to many epistemological 
lj 
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questions. The individual never has a wrong datum, in 
that he always perceives what he perceives. For example, 
in the delusive perceptual situation in which the per-
cipient observes a bent stick immersed in water, he has 
the correct percept of "bent stick," given the laws of 
refraction and differential densities of bodies; what must 
be corrected i .s the belief in the ontological status of 
the object, viz., that the stick actually is not bent. 
Hartshorne adds to this that, ''There is every reason to 
believe that the internalbodily conditions are at least 
more precisely correlated with experience than are the 
external conditions. 11 1 
It should be · added that sensation is both 11 represen-
tative11 and directly "presentative" of realtty.. It is 
''representative" of objects · outside the body--the 
individual immediately holds a datum in. attention, not the 
external object. And it is "presentative .. of "real 
cellular individuals within the body." 2 Sensation is a 
product of an intricate chain of inter-sympathetic reactions 
betv;een the cells in various parts of the body. When a 
br&An state results in· sensation, what occurs is the feeling 
of a brain cell combining into a comprehensive "super-
feeling" which is the sensation. The act of volition and 
1. MVG, 184. 
2. BH, 199. 
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the neuromusculature -chain of events that follow takes 
place in terms of a sympathetic series of felt-reactions. 
Hartshorne describes this as follows: 
To say that a thought' issues in action of the body means 
that some as.pe.ct or feeling-tone -of this thought is 
felt by brain cells, that this modification in their 
feeling is .felt by motor nerves and ultimately by 
muscle cells, and that this change in muscle cell 
feeling involves a shift in the degree of interaction 
among certain parts of the cell, i.e., a change in the 
pattern of . sympathetic int9raction, that is, -of spatial 
arrangement of muscle c!lls, thence also of bone cells 
and of the whole body. 
Thus, this is the first construct in the analog1.cal 
scheme: the mind~body relation in terms of which we are 
to understand. the individual both in. the phase of 
immediate volitional control .over the nervous mechanism, 
and in the phas.e. of cognitive immediacy, according to 
which .the individual has. immediate knowledge2 of the states 
of consciousness, both as these .states- infoi'IIl him of in ... 
tarnal physiological conditions and external situations. 
1. BH, 199-200. 
2. By "immediate knowledge" I refer not to the perceptual 
act, in which there is the external-cognitive relation 
of percipient to object; whether this relation is of an 
immediate or mediate character is open to question. By 
uimmediate knowledge" I refer to the content of the 
individual's conscious states--the mental data--as 
they are held in immediate awareness. 
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2. The Social Construct 
The social construct finds its basis in inter-
. subjective sympathy, or what may be called, empathy. In 
i 
I 
I 
lj 
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this experiential field of relations, individuals have a 
certain .capacity to transfer to each other a form of their 
personal dimension of feeling, and thereby create in each 
other a sense of the other's experience. 11We know and 
control others most intimately by sympathetic understanding, ~~ 
by sharing interests with them. u 1 As sta.ted in the pre-
ceding chapt.er, communication between minds takes place 
princj_pal1y through a complex ~ign medium. Through the 
adoption of certain attitudes and feelings of another 
individual, the individual can imaginatively penetrate, 
in a form, the otherwise opaque behavior of the other 
individual; his interests and motives are hence made 
reasonably transparent. Sociality is interaction, and 
interaction is impossible without the capacity of social 
beings to gain a reciprocity of feeling and an appropriate 
perspective of the mental dispos i tion of each other. This 
is necessary since individuals can socially behave toward 
each other only in terms of the l imits and requirements 
imposed upon the situation by the diversity of interests 
and desires invariably resulting from an a ggregate of 
1. MVG, 186. 
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beings with distinct individuali ties and free wills. 
The principle of immediacy, present in the mind-body 
relation, is lacking in inter-sympathetic experience, thus 
preserving the essential individuality of persons. Human 
communication requires intermediaries for establishing 
effective rapport between minds. !<'.now ledge of other 
minds is always gained mediately, and therefore permits 
social intercourse to achieve· a h igh degree of intimacy 
without, at the same time, dissolving the inner core of 
uniqueness which each personality posses.ses. Hartshorne 
ma kes this statement '\'Tith reference to communication. 
If human beings •••• saw immediately into each other's 
feelings and purposes, the independenee of individuals 
wou.ld be seriously curtailed, and with it the depth of 
originality and the power to surprise each other1which make up a good part of the value of human life. 
i Hence, i.n the social field of relations individuals 
li have the capacity for dynamic interaction, of a quality 
II 
!I that enables them to realize sympathetically the mental 
11 ste.tes and emotiona l tones of each other, '\'rithout 
II qualitatively infringing upon the inner states of t h e II 
/1 other individual, since relations must be carried on only 
11 through intermediary forms of communicat i on. 
II 
II II 
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3· The Unified ·construct 
The mind-body and social constructs, as analo gical 
premises for developing the view of Divine Being as a 
personality socially related to personalities, rema1n in 
t h ems elves incomplete, and in order that they may be 
properly combined into a unitary concept certain 
modifications must be made in each. As it stands, both 
constructs entail inherent difficulties, and yet the 
difficul.ties in each . can be resolved by incorporating the 
basic feature of one in the other. Directly it is this: 
The factor of immediacy in the mind-body relation, which 
the social rela.tion lacks, must be incorporated into the 
latter, and the factor of intercommunication between minds 
as concretely present in interpersonal sympathy, a factor 
which the mind-body relation ha s difficulty in explaining, 
must be. incorporated into this field. With these 
modi.fications, the grounds are s.e.t . for an intelligible 
understanding of the two rundamental aspects of Divine 
s ocial relationship: the relation of awareness between 
God and individuals, and the relation between Divine Mind 
and hume.n minds .• 
The unified construct combines the printiples of 
immediacy and sociality into a more inclusive analogical 
equation, describing the mind-body relation not only as the 
immediate awareness of the whole over the parts, but in 
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terms of a social complex, in which there is cognitive 
communication between the whole and the parts, and between 
the parts themselves; and describing the social construct 
in terms of individuals possessing immediacy in their 
inter-sympathetic knowledge. In regard to the social 
construct, the concept hypothetically refers to a social 
field in which a radical cognitive differential exists 
between members and hence whose cognitive immediacy does 
not conflict with individuality as it would on the human-
to-human scale. 1 Thus, the relation between mind and 
body is placed into a social context, and the relation 
between minds is endowed with immediacy. 
1. This is directly related to the explanation in 
Chapter 1 of the intelligibility of cosmic order in 
terms of higher and lower mental types. 
I' 
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CHAPTE..~ I I I 
THE COGNITIVE-CAUSAL STRUCTURE OF THE 
DIVINE RELATIONSHIP 
1. Transition to Cosmic-Scale Existence 
The RELATION of God to the world must necessarily 
be conceived, if at all, by analogy with relations 
given in human experience. 1 
Our lu"lowledge of deity is limited, and in every 
instance, except in the case of intuitional experience, 
gained through mediate processes of knowledge. l~'lan must 
resort to analogies in his attempt to understand a Divine 
Existent who has such superior magnitudes of power and 
perfection, whose relations extend into every aspect of 
reality, and therefore whose concrete inclusiveness 
essentially transcends the partial range of human 
understanding of the direct and literal kind. 
I:f the individual believes in. the validity of the 
basic religious doctrine that man is the image of God, he 
must attempt to understand him, therefore, in those precise 
terms in which his relations correspond in some major 
fashion to the relations inherent in the human social 
structure. 
The question of God being related at all to the world 
1. MVG, 174. 
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is already disposed of iV we are to understand God as a 
personality, and since a personality outside of a social 
context is inconceivable, he must be social, and hence he 
must be conceived in relations. If God is conceived in 
relations, then the "absoluten aspect of" his nature must 
be qualified by the fact of his relatedness, and therefore 
he must be conceived aa "surrelative." 
The appropriateness of" the mind-body and social con-
structs for formulating on analogy a meaningful concept 
describing Divine relations, is, according to Hartshorne, 
adequately grounded on the following considerations: 
First, God in relation ,to man must be conceived as 
(A) a Mind communicating with minds; (B) as a Divine Will 
actively initiating change; (C) as a being possessing 
omniscience; but in addition, God must have (a) the 
capacity to communicate immediately with minds without 
destroying the unique individuality of persons; (b) God 
must be able to initiate change without physical determiners; I 
(c) God must have omniscience over every segment of reality. lr 
It is necessary, therefore, that an adequate concept of a 
socially related Divine Being must include and properly 
describe these attributes, in terms of" which he can relate I 
I himself causally and sympathetically to the individual. 
Since divine relations must be conceived in some 
corsesponding fashion to human relations, it is necessary 
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that analogies are obtained within the structure of human 
experience that can provide a reasonable and empirically 
coherent basis for explaining such relat i ons. Hartshorne's 
~ I contention that those specifiable relations in the human 
dimension which most fully satisfy this criterion are ./ 
those directly given in the mind-body and social situations. 1! 
is in his belief well based on a select aggregation of 
empirical data: Tn the mind-body relation there are the 
facts of immediat.e unitary cognitive and volitional-neural 
activity; in the social relation the fact of inter-
sympath.etic communication. In the first relation one finds 
the grounds for developing the most intelligible explanation 
of God's cognitive and volitional powers, and in the second 
relation, the grounds for understanding the social 
character of communication between minds, and hence, between 
the Divine Mind and human minds. By introducing immediacy 
into the social relation, and sociality into the cognitive-
volitional mind-body relation, and relieving the active 
components of their human limitations, the premise is thus 
established for making the appropriate analogical deductions. , 
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2. Divine Cognition 
The difference between God's consciousness and the 
individual's consciousness is one of quantity, we know 
only in part, God knows all. God's cognitive powers have 
the same qualitative immediacy as man's, but this identical 
qualitative immediacy is spread out over the total range 
of objects, whereas man's awareness reaches only a limited 
range.l "Since nothing can be more immediate than 
immediate--the only dimension left for God's superiority is 
that of scope and completeness with respect to all the 
2 
objects in the universe." At least, upon analogy, we can 
conceive of God's omniscience if we conceive it as 
generated by a qualitatively identical cognitive experience, 
only without limit.s . If there is a qualitative difference 
between Divine cognition and human cognition, then this 
difference remains inconceivable and the analogy is 
worthless. 
Divine cognition is absolute or nonrelative since it 
is merely a vehicle for Divine knowledge. It is a vehicle 
in the same sense that. volition is, i.e., cognitive process 
does not ~, as volition does not ~· It is the person 
1. See Chapter 1 in reference to the comment on awareness 
as "extensity of feeling." 
2. MVG, 178. 
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who knows through cognition, as the person- who acts through 
volition. The type of relation which cognitive experience 
may denote is not itself subject to relations. Hartshorne 
calls divine cognition "cognitive adequacy" which only 
means that it possesses no limits insofar as it is only a 
nonrelative means through which divine knowledge is gained. 
Hence it is not paradoxical to assert that God is 
relativized with respect to everything he knows and yet 
absolute in -the knowing , for although in knowing God must 
be related .to the known~ the capacity in virtue of which 
the knowing experience is possible is itself not an object 
of knowledge. As Hartshorne states: "There is here no 
paradox, unless it be paradoxical that seeing does not see, 
or that humour doesnot laugh." 1 
Omni.science denotes the totality of relationships 
involved in the divine kno\'ring: "Omniscience . is knowledge 
that is in some sense equal to its objects, whereas non-
omnis.cience is knowledge unequal to what it knows." 2 This 
at-least-equal relation is the relation of "adequacy," and 
hence attached to cognition implies that God possesses the 
capacity for complete knowledge of all actuals (and 
possibles). Omniscience must be conceived as total cognition 
1. Hartshorne, TDR, 122. 
2. TDR, 120. 
28 
I 
.I 
II 
r 
of the universe, in all of its particulars. In respect to 
unknown objects, they are unkno1.·m on the scale of human 
cognition only as they are poorly particularized, i.e., 
known only in their vague outlines; '\vhereas divine 
omniscience confronts no unknown objects, i.e., all objects 
in the universe are known in their fullest capacity of being 
known. Thus God .knows the. individual in his entirety, 
whereas the individual knows God only in part, hence an 
asymmetrical relation. 
As for the futurity of the individual, God knows that 
futurity as a vague datum, since vagueness is that which 
defines the futurity of what is future. "Nothing is vague 
in the perfect kne\'dedge except as this vagueness coincides 
with futurity. 11 1 
Cognitive immediacy operates in terms of a subject-
object 'prehending ' relationship. The term 'prehension' 
was originally suggested by Whitehead, and in order to 
understand what use Hartshorne makes of it, a statement 
concerning the explicit meaning of this term should be 
made. One of \\lb.itehead 's primary definitions of 'prehension' 
is the following: "The analysis of an actual entity into 
'prehensions' is that mode of analysis which exhibits the 
most concrete elements in the nature o.f actual entities. n 2 
1. MVG, 328. 
2. V\lhitehead, PAR, 28. 
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A prehension reproduces in itself the general traits of 
an actual entity. Whitehead states that a prehension is 
. 1 
"Only a subordinate element in an actual entity." This 
is to assert that a prehension, qua prehension, is not 
intelligible unless the total concrete item in which the 
prehension occurs is known. A prehension is a "concrete 
fact of relatedness." It makes all concrete relational 
experiences possibl.e, since it comprises the most 
fundamental int.er-subjective mode of comprehension, though 
comprehension in its most concrete and immediate form--
hence the term prehension, which is the distinct cognitive 
''feel" of another center of feeling-- 11 feeling a feeling." 
As prehension is the immediate grasping of .an element 
in concrete actuality, so ingression is the incorporation 
I· of this element into the subjective constitution of the 
I prehending entity. In the words of Emmet: "Ingression is 
the entry of a form into the constitution of an actuality 
eo that it becomes an 'ingredient' in it.'1 2 
In terms of the prehensive character of cognitive 
immediacy, we must understand that divine cognition is not 
merely conscious awareness, the merely "taking account of, 11 
but as prehension. This is the creative experiential act 
of knowing, the divine being entering into the subjective 
1. PAR, 29. 
2. Emmet, WPO, 41. 
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r-:oma1n of the individual's experience. Thus, God knows the 
individual's experience in those very qualitative modes 
that constitute the experience for the individual; i.e., 
God knows the fee11ngs· in identical fashion as the 
individual feels his feelings. In addition, as God feels 
the individual, so the individual feels God, only that the 
relation of feeling is asymmetrical, since God's feeling of 
the individual .. is totally inclusive, "rlhereas the individual' s j 
feeling of God is only partial. In this preclse sense can 
we properly understand how the cognitive-social relation 
between God and man can be immediate, yet without denying 
the individuality of the person--as with the analogy of man 
feeling the feeling of a cell, bet ween whom a radical 
cognitive differential exists. God can invade the most 
private precincts of the individual's life without the 
individual sensing a proportional loss of autonomy, since 
his cognition of God is entirely limited to obscure and 
fragmentary data •. 
God's all-inclusive prehension of the individual 
involves not only his particularity, but also all of his 
conscious directions. God knows all of the finite 
perspectives and "feeling tones" of the finite individual. 
Upon pure analogical . considerations, in terms of 
Hartshorne's . concept of the cosmic organism, God may be 
conceived, in part, as an entity constituted of an inter-
I 
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sympathetic complex of inferior cognitive parts within a 
superior cognitive \'Thole. The divine mind is related to 
the world in the same qualitative fashion as the human 
mind is related to the individual body, only that man's 
immediate awareness of the content. of his cognitive field 
is restricted to merely a few constituents, vaguely 
particularized, whereas God possesses omniscient immediacy 
with all el.ements of reality. 
The analogy of the mind-body relation in which the 
individual's cog..'l'litive experience is more precisely 
correlated with his internal states thanwith external 
conditions, must be corrected in respect to divine 
cognitive experience. Also, in human experienc.e there is 
always external reference to components outside of the 
individual, which does not appear in the divine experience. 
For example, with visual perception, Hartshorne states: 
Visual perception is shot through with inference aiming 
at the external world; subtract this inference, as we 
must do to conceive the immediacy of omniscience, and 
it is the relation to the optical nervous system that 
remains e.s worthy of use in the theological analogy. 1 
Thus, God 1 simmediacy holds for every constituent of 
reality and hence his cognitive knowledge is entirely 
denotable . by an internal relation of knower to things known. 
But since man's immediacy holds for only a limited area of 
1. MVG, 184. 
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experience, his cognitive knowledge is hence denotable 
partly by an internal relation and partly by an external 
relation of knower to things known. 
33 
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3· Divine Volition and Causal Determination 
A God who is cognitively and organically related to 
the individual through bonds of sympathy, and who moves 
and acts, creates and wills within the variables of his 
creation, is a God whose volition and causal power must be 
conceived in a form which radically differs from -that of 
the traditiona.l conception of theism. The view of theism 
with its rigid division between Absolute Will and contingent 
human wills, and its doctrine of divine passivity and active 
determination, is .subject to so many logical confusions 
and outright contradictions, that if any intelligible 
meaning is to be found in the concept of divine will, it 
must be found in a different view, one which can be 
defended on sound logical and empirical grounds. 
This more adequate view may be discovered within the 
causal implications of the mind-body relation, in which 
volition and organic sympathy are constitutive factors. 
Causality can be understood most intelligibly in terms of 
volition. For it is only in the volitional act that we 
directly encounter an unmediated series of causal events, 
or1 g1nat.1ng in the immediate impress of a nonmaterial act, 
viz., will, upon physical structures. If in volition we 
can find the principle in terms of. which we may explain 
causality, then we must follow all of its implications to 
their logical conclusions. · These implications when traced 
I 
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through the mind-body analogy terminate in two principles 
concerning the · nature and process of divine volition and 
causal determination: 
(a) The divine volition must not be conceived in terms 
of an "unmoved mover" or "passive act" relation contained 
within the Absolute and remaining totally exclusive of 
the universe, but as divine creative response to contingent 
particulars within:_ the universe of contingent particulars. 
(b) Divine will must be explained as acting through 
contingent wills, though not limited by them. In addition, 
there is the. collateral principle which asserts that God 
wills without possessing physical apparatus, since, upon 
the previous analogy, the world is God's body, and hence 
God wills through the constituents of the world-body. 
The divine will willing within the universe of 
contingent wills is the conclusion at which Hartshorne 
arrives, in his discussion of decisi.on, in reference to 1 ts 
existential location. The traditional .doctrine asserts 
that decision is in the ''Divine Essence,'' but this makes 
decision determined and therefore denies the freedom of the 
will. The surrelativistic solution is that decision 11 is 
in God, but not in his essence (i.e., as something 
contingent).n 1 In locating decision in God is to re:fer its 
place in the active, self-willing nature o:r a Being related 
1. TDR, 118. 
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to all. Thus the contradictory doctrine of a pas.sive l-1111 
actively willing , and a will affecting change and yet 
remaining outside of the context of change, is replaced by 
the view of divine will as creative activity--since the 
surrelative God eliminates the need for Absolute 
immutabi.lity--and activity \'Vi thin the universe in which it 
affects change. 
The principle or divine will acting through contingent 
wills is simply a necessary specification or the first 
principle, since it is inconceivable thatGod wills 
in vacuo, or through non-responsive particulars. God must 
act through responsive self-willing agents, otherwise the 
validity of the religious idea that God works through man, 
and yet without a determinism that revoke·s his freedom, 
cannot be demonstrated. Hartshorne states the case in 
precise terms: 
Activity, volition, cannot work u pon nothing or merely 
upon itself •••• Choice is among impulses or desires, 
not among 'ideas, 1 mere inert pictures or forms. God 
has a definite problem to solve only because he actually 
wants conflicting things through his participation in 
conflicting things, th~ough h is participation in 
conflicting desires and volitions. He wishes that 
others should have their wish; it is their wishinge 
that fUrniSh the matter for his choice by becoming a 
set of desires within hie life. Lov~ makes control 
selr-control by communicating desires. 1 
1. MVG, 292. 
The concluding statement is highly significant for the 
par..ticular expression it gives to Hartshorne's fundamental 
analogies: The idea of sympathy betweenmirid relations and 
sec:c.le 
mind-body relations, expanded to cosmic salae, finds its 
highest meaning in a Divine :Mind embracing the world_-body 
through sympathetic relations, asserting its power and 
volition in and through the subjects of these relations. It 
is through this process of sympathetic communication that 
divine love emerges as a thing with concrete meaning. It 
is a loving God who has at his disposal the most e-ffective 
means for expressing that love in its richest and most 
meaningful forms through every concrete individual 
actuality. Thus, Hartshorne asserts: 
We shall never understand a God of love unless we 
conceive him as the all-sensitive mind of the world-body 
~ • • • .Only in the mind-body relation is power also 
sensitiveness, is slmpathy direct awareness, is awareness 
sympathetic power. 
In conceiving the world as God's body, as the physical 
medium through which the_ divine volition introduces change, 
Hartshorne uses the terms 'muscle-nerve' and 'nerve-muscle' 
in describing the mechanism. In these terms God's volition 
is conceived as related to the world as though every item 
in it were to him a nerve-muscle, and his omniscience is 
related to it in that manner in which every item were to 
1. BH, 208. 
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appear as a muscle-nerve. We find the analogy for this in 
the mind-body relation, in Hartshorne's words: 11A brain I 
:::e~8 1:0 :h::· 1:: ::t:::: :o::::-::::::d: :u:u:::~ta, ll 
and our thoue;hts to its motion." 1 This is to say that 
every object reacts to God's volitional impress as a nerve 
cell to human will, but that every object also reacts to 
the nerve-reactors in such determinate ways as can 
generate movement and change, analo gously to muscular 
structures reacting to nerve discharges in the human body. 
It seems evident, then, that divine cognition, volition 
and causal determination can be explained without 
contradiction only if we are able to establish these aspects 
of the divine nature analogously on relations given in 
human experience. These relations must serve as analogies 
in terms of which we can alone understand, through concepts 
which have concrete meaning and are free of contradictions, 
the ways in which God relates himself to the individual. 
1. MVG, 185. 
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4. The Organic Argument and the 
Problem of Evil 
At this point reference should be made to the problem 
of evil as it confronts not only the social analogy, but 
the entire organic argument. The problem is this: If in 
virtue of the omniscient character of divine cognition, 
God is to experience all activity, every feeling and 
attitude occurring in the world, then must he not necessarily1 
experience conflict, negativity, and therefore must not the 
world-body lack perfect "harmonized unity"? And, must not 
God la.ck . that per:f'ection and 1n:f'inite bliss that religious 
men have traditionally imputed to him if he must experience 
evil as well as goodness? In experiencing evil, must not 
God absorb into his being not only that identlcal 
negativity present in an evil act, but the very element or 
moral perverseness that distinguishes an act as being evil? l 
To these questions, we must answer partly in the af:f'irmatlve 
that there is a. form of real conflict in the divine nature, 
and hence in the wo~ld-body, and that God in a precise sense 
does experience the element of negativity in an evil act, 
I 
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and thus that he does not enjoy infinite bliss as I 
tradi ti~nally conceived. But in a.ddi tion to these admissions il 
certa in important distinctions must be made, as they shall · 11 
1. See Chapter 4, the first section under "Ethical 
Objections to Traditional Theism. 11 
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be in the followinQ paragraphs. 
In respect to the matter of conflict in the world-body, 
H.art.shorne remarks: 
It (the 1-Torld-body) may be absolutely unified in so far 
as unity is the basis of co-presence to one awareness, 
the divine comniscience; but there is experiential 
warrant for admitting that a kind of ronfl1ct and evil 
is compatible with such co-presence. 
The conception of God as a being who inclusively 
participates in all experiences at once negates the 
traditional notion of total bliss, and for more reasons than ' 
simply by force of the logic of the "social argument, 11 since 'I 
:I the conception represents the only alternative in explaining 
:jiow the essential religious idea that God loves and is dis-
"...,.t pleased by sin can be affirmed wi thA equivocation. If God 
continually enjoys absolute bliss, then can human tragedy, 
human failures and human sin have any existential 
significance for him, since in his absolute bliss he has 
absolute immunity against all discordin the world. If 
love means genuine concern for others, then to say that God 
infinitely loves his creatures while at the same time 
remaining blissfully indifferent to their conflicts is 
simply to indulge in a bit or uverbal magic. 11 
An empirical analysis reveals that there is a dual-
II 
I 
J selective f:unction involved in acts of awareness: There are 
Jill 1. IIITVG, 195 • 
the factors of pleasure and harmony that determine awareness, .1 
but these are not the sole determinants, since pain and d 
conflicts enter in decisive fashion into the process of 
awareness, insofar as the social motivation is agreed to be 
a fact in the situation. The individual certainly has a 
tendency to share in the experiences of others, even if 
negative or at discord with his own. "Hence awareness is 
to be viewed as the product of a double selection, on the 
one hand with .a view to harmony, on the other with a view 
to soC-ial inclusiveness .• n 1 Now if the divine awareness 
is to bear some authentic similarity to human awareness, 
compatible with the experiential meaning of the term, it 
must be viewed in like fashion as "the product of a double 
selection," according to which both harmonious and con-
flict i ng components enter into every such acts of awareness. 
If divine omniscience must .kn0\'1 evil, it must know 
through experience, and thus God must ''experience the 
quality of evil.u 2 But to experience the quality of evil 
is not to participate in the evil act as partner with the 
agent. The evilness of an act belongs exclusively to the 
agent perpetrating the act. 
Thus it can be affirmed that there is the element of 
discord in the divine nature as well as harmony, if we 
1. MVG, 196. 
2. !-NG, 196. 
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agree that God is to be conceived as a maximally socially-
inclusive being, but that the moral blindness that qualifies 
an evil act does not qualify the divine awareness. God 
experiences the negativity in an evil act but does not share 
in the deliberate choice of non-realization that defines an 
individual as a malefactor in the particular situation. 1 
1. See Chapter 4, the discussion on "Divine Love"; note 
the three characteristics of love: sensitivity, 
identification, and participation. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DIVINE LOVE AND HUMAN MOTIVATION 
1. Ethical Objections to Traditional Theism 
I 
I 
II 
I 
Historical theism views man as an wholly impotent I 
being, subject both to the gross imperfections of his earthly ! 
domain and to the all,-absolute authority o.f C-od. The 'J 
ethical relation between God and human individuals is of a 
kind in which genuine sociality is absent, since God and 
man stand at cosmic extremes on the scale of existence, with 
nothing short of attaining absolute perfection to breach 
the interminable gap. C-od occupies a spaceless-timeless 
world, in which all conceivable values have been realized, 
and the self-sufficiency and complete perfection of his 
being make him totally "other" in his relation to his im-
perfect creatures. The ethical relation between divine 
being and man in such a universe is of a fixed and static 
type, so aptly expressed in the saying, "God is in his 
heaven and all's well with the world. 11 God has reached 
total moral perfection, man has yet an eternity to achieve 
it, and in whatever moral or social status he finds himself 
in this world, it is to be accepted with pious patience as 
divinely ordained and therefore inevitable. 
The objections against this view are in great measure 
of a significantly ethical character, major among them 
being the following: 
(1) It renders the injunction, ''Be ye perfect as your 
Father in heaven is perfect," a literal impossibility, since 
what is considered perfect ln the divine nature is con-
sidered imperfect in human nature, and no matter how 
I intensely and eff'ecti vely man may attempt to improve himself, :1 
he is constitutionally determined--so traditional theism 
mainta ins--to remain wholly imperfect. Logically the odds 
are against him, since only "absolute" or "perfect" 
predicates are deemed legitimate in describing traits in 
! 
the divine nature, e..nd, a.t the same time, only ''non-absolute"! 
or "non-perfect" predicates are considered legitimate in 
descri bing traits in human nature, even though the traits 
may in both cases be identical! 
The convenient notion that imperfection here is 
compensated by perfe ction in some other region of the vast 
cosmos is readily accepted by those who cannot quite 
understand why their i mmediate world should be on every 
hand characterized by imperfections and inequalities, when 
the author of that world is an absolute, perfect being. 
They cannot reconcile the fact t hat there is actual 
imperfection, e.g. suffering, with the notion that God is 
wholly absolute in pO'\tler and perfect in love. 
dilemma was well described inHume's Dialogues. 
1. See Hume's Dialogues, Books 5 and 10. 
This serious 
1 
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Moral development in a divine univers.a · presupposes 
human agents with flexible, responsive-receptive natures, 
who enjoy an adequate measure of genuine freedom, and a 
divine being, who though perfect in his power of valuation 
is not so in the total realization of value. And, in 
addition, it also presupposes moral agents and a divine 
being who by their individual valuations, concretely affect 
each other, in a complex three-term pattern: moral agents 
affecting each other, moral agents affecting God, end God 
by his moral acts, affecting the agents. Such a universe 
in which ethical . dec.isions and moral behavior have a real 
inter-functional, soci.al dimension, is impossible if viewed 
in terms of theism. 
Man in theism stands on one side of the abyss, a 
permanent subject to imperfection, and a moral agent whose 
decisions and actions resolve into null items before the 
self-sufficient and immobile Being. And God stands on the 
other side, the "retired Artisan, 11 who has .finished the 
universe, producing all value that could be conceived, and 
now "sits back" to contemplate for eternity his wondrous 
creation. 
(2) Traditional theism gives divine sanction to social 
inequalities. Marx in his time sensed the bitter social 
undertones of the religious orthodoxy which prevailed in 
19th Century bourgeois society: 
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Religious misery is in one mouth the expression of 
real misery, and in another is a protestation against 
realy misery. Reli gion is the moan of the oppressed 
creature •••• It is the opium of the people. 1 
Lenin, in even more explicit terms, described religion 
as an ideological tool employed by the exploiters for 
securing and extending their ends, and seized upon by the 
exploited as temporary haven of escape from the fears and 
insecuri~ies generated by a capitalist society: 
Religfon teaches those who toil in poverty all their 
lives to be resigned and patient in this worldt and 
consoles them with the hope of reward in heaven •••• 
Religion is a kind of spiritual intoxicant, in which 
the slaves of capital drown their humanity and their 
desires for some sort of decent human existence. 2 
If these generalized conclusions are confined to that 
form of reli gion rooted in the theology of theism, then 
they are reasonably accurate, for it is in those very 
similar terms that Hartshorne criticizes theism (assuming 
Hartshorne to be the authority here~), that is, as a 
convenient conceptual device used by power factions for 
perpetuating social disparities. 
Those who have power of such kind and degree as virtually 
to enslave their fellows point to the absolute righteous-
ness of the Dispenser of all powers. Moreover, those who 
are on the other side of social inequalities tend to 
accept these religious apologies for their misfortur1es, 
1. Marx, CHPR, 12. 
2. Lenin, REL, 7. 
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and to console themselves with the hope of restitution 
in a future life. 1 
(3) Another ethical objection to historical theism 
centers on the fact that one who accepts its tenets and at 
the same time, recognizes the legitimacy and validity of 
modern scientific knowledge, is not perror.ming his 
intel.lectual duties with consistent integrity. How can 
one, with any degree of rational consistency, accept modern 
principles of logic together with authentic scientific 
grounds for conducting intelligent inquiry, and yet 
suscribe to beliefs contained in such a view as theism 
which remain . totally devoid of scientific foundation? 
(4) One major objection to theism is directed against 
its methodological practice of isolating metaphysical from 
ethical lines of inquiry, producing, as it were, a sharp 
cleavage between metaphysical and ethical concepts, and e.s 
a consequence, resulting in the formation of inconsistent, 
and in many instances, wholly contradictory statements. 
Integrated inquiry has the superior advantage of 
introducing precise counterchecks on separate lines of 
investigation, thus bringing into coherent relation meta-
physical with ethical insights. 
In view of these objections it appears evident that 
the divine ethical relation must be described in terms 
1. MVG, 142-43• 
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other than those of traditional theism. It must be 
described in those terms which not only can adequately meet 
such objections as these, but which can produce theological 
concepts that correspond with what is agreed to be the 
most fundamental and genuine insights of historic religious 
faith. 
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2. Human Motivation 
In general, the possibility of a theology depends 
upon the possibility of making our basic conceptions 
adequate to a supreme instance. Thus, there cannot 
be a perfect love if love is such that it must 
necessarily be imperfect. 
There is the familiar argument, propounded (oddly 
enough) by atheists and bishops alike, that such a thing 
as genuine love is simply pure fiction, and that all 
motivation ultimately roots in the d esire for self-enjoyment 
and the realization of personal interests. Value-judgements 
function solely on the scale of subjective preference, in 
terms of which those attitudes and actions are chosen which 
are shown to bring the greatest pleasure to the individual. 
Upon this view, some individuals attempt to show that 
perfect divine love is impossible, unless it be perfect 
self-love, which, if so, makes God a farce for religious 
ethics. Also, these individuals might suggest, if love is 
entirely egocentric on the human level, but "genuine" on 
the absolute divine level, then we must be driven to the 
ridiculous conclusion that an absolute God is perfectly 
loving his creatures who themselves not only cannot return 
even a part of that love, but who are constitutionally wholly 
self-seeking creatures, a conclusion that not only makes a 
1. MVG, 144. 
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reasonable religious ethics impossible, but which in 
addition suggests a metaphysical relation--if "relation" 
means "social interaction 11 --that has no foundation in 
certified experience. 
According to this view, the individual is said to act 
rightly if he acts rationally, that is, insofar as such 
action i s calculated to enhancehis own status in society. 
The ultimate objective, and the only real objective, is to 
promote one's own welfare. Thus if one selects to 
sacrifice some intermediate interest for the intere-st of 
another person, it can be shown that one is doing so with 
the view to gaining some greater future good, or perhaps, 
social approval. which one may desire in order to achieve 
complete happiness in a social environment. 
As it stands, this view is entirely unsatisfactory 
and in one major respect factually erroneous, insofar as 
it turns on the as.sumption that the individual is onl;y: 
and always motivated by the desire to secure and improve 
his ovm welfare. This false assumption arises from the 
failure to consider temporal factors in the motive-interest 
situation. It is true, certainly, that a man will do only 
that which he has some interest in doing, and if by 
"promoting one's own welfare" means "interest in doing such 
and such," then the view merely resolves itself in the 
tautology that "what he is interested in doing he is 
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interested in doing.n 1 But the view does not entail mere 
tautology insofar as it claims that the object desired is 
that which in its realization brings pleasure to the 
individual. And it is by introducing a temporal distinction 
into the analysis that this assumption can be shown to be 
incorrect. 
In the first place, desire refers to a state of affairs 
which waits for :future realization, and yet the state of 
expectation can itself bring pleasure prior to the 
realization of the desired conditions. 
We are bound to be pleased by the prospect of bringing 
about what we desire to bring about. But it does not 
follow that wha~ we desire is our own state of ~ 
being pleased. 
The nresent self may benefit from the choice it makes, 
that is, it may receive pleasure from the action it has 
taken, but the future object of the choice may or may not 
bring benefit to the future self of the individual. The 
individual is not constantly motivated by those objects 
which will alone bring personal pleasure to him. He may 
be in many cases, but in just as many oases he may be 
motivated otherwise, acting out of interest for another 
person in view of those goods which may bring pleasures to 
that person. It must be understood that the desire 
1. !vi.VG, 145. 
2. MVG, 145. 
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certainly is accompanied by pleasurable satisfactions, but 
such satisfactions do not necessarily derive from the 
objects of the desire since desire may be an object which 
has no relation to the personal welfare of the individual. 
Or even if desire is related to some personal benefit, it 
still remains a future object and therefore plays no part 
in the immediate scheme of the individual's satisfactions. 
In a word, then, as Hartshorne states: "It can be shown by 
many lines of reasoning that the future welfare of others 
can be a motive as direct and genuine as one's own future 
welfare." 1 
The view that all motivation rests in self-interest 
again wrongly assumes that self-interest is a totally 
independent, autonomous function of the ego, a wholly 
internal attitude enduring without reference to the social 
context. That this is not so is revealed in the fact that 
interest in oneself in great measure depends upon one's 
interest in others. "To believe •••• that one's welfare 
I 
is of no importance to others is to have little heart for i 
furthering it, is in fact to be tempted to destroy oneself." /2 
Even the most intense egotist has some "interest" in the 
welfare of a weak-willed friend if for no other reason than 
1. MVG, 14-q. 
2. MVG, 147. 
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the selfish desire to keep that friend a subject to and 
admirer of his egotistical whims. This is to say that 
self-interest in the majority of cases has social 
reference whether it is expressed in the attitude of nall 
for oneself," in which case the individual is deliberately 
guiding his behavior in avoidance or rejection of the 
interests of others, or whether it is expressed in the 
"supersocial 11 attitude of ''all for others." . Altruism and 
egoism are reverse extremes on the scale of individual 
interests. 
It is not to be denied that one derives enjoyment from 
acts which are intended to help others. The individual may 
gain an equal proportion of pleasure in serving the welfare 
of others as he may his own. What must be affirmed, in 
correction of the opposing view, is that interests appear 
first and derivative enjoyments second. Mr. Jones is not 
interested in X because he enjoys X, he, on the contrary, 
enjoys X because he is first interested in X. It is 
because one is interested in another's welfare that the 
interest and the actions that follow from it contribute 
to one's own welfare, and not conversely. 
There is, then, both self-interest and other-interest. 
If one's desire is for a state of future pleasure for 
oneself, it · is self-intE!rest;. if it is desire for a state 
of pleasure for others, it is other-interest. And as both 
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types of interest-attitudes are authentic ingredients in 
the social experi ence of individuals, it must follow that 
motivation is not simply a function of self-interest, but, 
also, of other-interest. 
Insofar as it can be demonstrated that love in its 
genuine sense is not fiction, but a factual, and necessary, 
component of motivation in a social context, are we able 
to derive the basic concept ad.equate to a divine instance, 
since if on the human level love is not merely self-seeking 
but essentially includes interest in others, then to .a. 
max-imally greater degree can we conceive divine love in 
such qualitative terms as embodying the highest instance of 
inclusive social participation. 
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3• Divine Love 
To understand the nature of divine love we must first 
understand the nature and function of human love. To assert 
that divine love is altogether super i or and qualitatively 
distinct from human love is not only to suggest directly 
that all discussion. about the subject is fruitless, since 
it is inconceivable, but further to imply a belief very 
closely resembling that of traditional theism. For in 
traditional theism the belief is . that becaus·e of . the 
radical differential between the affective capacities of 
the divine being and human beings, direct, effective 
rapport between. the divine and human being is therefore 
impossible. This thesis surrelativism rejects, since it 
maintains that it is only in terms of the view which 
describes divine love as qualitatively corresponding to 
human love., in terms of which some form of intimate inter-
action can occur in the God-man relationship, that we can 
possibly discover any genuine meaning in the fundamental 
religious assertion, "God is love. 11 
Love is a function of sociality, the participation 
of conscious agents in each other's experience. Love is 
made possible· through the act of prehension--the feeling 
of feeling--on the human level, the quasi-interpenetration 
of one "feeling nature'' in another. Prehension. is a. 
necessary, though not sufficient, condition of love. 
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Without prehension love would have no experiential 
signification, if it would have even abstract meaning. But 
love as an act of prehension in addition involves essen-
tially another condition, that which alone distinguiShes 
the 11 feeling-datum 11 love in a particular prehension from 
other "feeling-data," e.g., hate; namely, it is constituted 
by peculiarly distinct affective tones of sympathy, expressed 
in an objective concern for another's welfare. It is through 
the individual's capacity to realiee his identification with 
another's mental state that _he can express a genuine interest 
in that person 1 s wel_fare. This identification must be 
understood, though, as only partial and incomplete on the 
human scale, and its feeling component as correlative 
rather than .identical. It is only the divine being who 
can experience the ind.ividuality and vividness of a feeling 
in other beings. 
The concern for another's welfare is expressed- in the 
desire :for those things which can produce a satisfactory 
state of existence for that individual. "Love is desire 
for the good of others, ideally all others." 1 In more 
particular terms, HartShorne states: 
Love means realization in oneself of the desires and 
experiences of others, so that one who loves can in 
so far inflict suffering only by undergo~g this 
suffering himself, willingly and fully. 
1. MVG, 14. 
2. MVG, 31. 
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Love in its particular expression, on the human level, 
involves exclus ive mutuality, i.e., positive relation 
between only a few indivi duals or groups of individuals, 
but in its total expres s ion, on the divine level, it 
involves inclusive mutuality, i.e., posit ive relation of 
God with all conscious beings. In terms of intensity, love 
on the human scale may qualitatively correspond to divi ne 
love, but in terms of extensity, human love covers only a 
partial range of relations, whereas divine love extends 
over the total re..nge of relations. 
Love reveals a universal fact abotlt the structure atld 
process of life, that is, that social relations and 
resultant forms of integration, are constitutive factors 
in all life activity, both in the microscopic and macro-
scopic world. Integre.ted structure and activity is a 
resultant of the complex harmony attained among the 
activity patterns .of individual items in the life scheme. 
What is commonly conceived as disintegration may be viewed 
as merely energy-quanta transitions, in which there occurs 
a re-distribution of units in a given social system, in-
volving a new combination of relations and a new structural 
integration. 
Divine love in the meaning of sensitivity, as the 
most adequate mode of awareness of the internal state of 
all individuals, is absolute, that is, absolute in t erms 
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of maximal cognitive sufficiency. Both in felt-awareness 
and effective responsivity--God is always maximally 
responsive--divine love is perfect, that is, absolute. 
This absolutivity is to be understood as . analogous to the 
quality of absoluteness in divine cof;nition, as conscious 
immediacy with every deta.il of the cosmos, except in this 
case, the cognitive process is given an additional 
dimension in the positive affective tones accompanying the 
sensitivities of love. But in every other substantive 
meaning of divine love, the predicate terms are relational. 
since divine love has cognitive and religious meaning only 
as it functions within a social context, that is, expressed 
through a total system of relations. Divine love as 
rapport and sensitive concern for the individual in his 
immed i ate situation, is maximally adequate, but inasmuch 
as this love has a relational function--and can the term 
have any other meaning?--it is qualified by that function 
and therefore is itself relative. 
The intimate rapport occurring in divine love for 
the individual is of a character that exceeds mere anxious 
concern for human '\-Telfare in its particular form, for it 
involves a more inclusive and intense social participation 
in the form Qf sharing directly in the interest, preferences, 
and accomplishments of the individual. 11 For either God 
loves the creat ures or he does not. If he does, then their 
interests contribute to his interests for love means nothing 
more than this.u 1 To the degree thatGod enters into the 
complex and conrlicting interest-patterns of man does he 
become a party to those conflicts, and, hence, are those 
problems of man produced by his conflicting interests 
identically his. 
God passively wishes with and for the creatures what 
they wish for themselves, but his activity lies in 
deciding how to resolve the conflict o~ interests 
which he has thus taken into himself. 
God is not merely the being who perfectly but 
passively loves, whose concerns and understanding attain 
an absolute pitch, but who experientially remains outside 
the arena of human strife. Divine love in its only 
authentic meaning refers to the total experiential 
participation of God in the human situation. As Hartshorne 
states: 
The lover is not merely the one who unwaveringly 
understand and tries to help; the lover is just as 
emphatically the one who takes unto himself the varying 
joys and sorrows of others, and whose own happiness is 
capable of alteration thereby. 3 
Thus there is that factor in the divine relationship 
1. ~IVG, 164. 
2. MVG; 293. 
3• MVG, 111. 
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which Hartshorne calls ''sympathetic dependence, 11 which is 
"A sign of excellence and \'Taxes with every ascent in the 
scale of being." 1 The highest form of "sympathetic 
dependence'' can be seen only in the divine nature, since 
it cannot be less than an "omniscient sympathy" which 
remains acutely sensitive to every feeling of joy and 
sorrow anywhere in the universe. 
This is a view which is at every step a direct 
argument against traditional th.eism. Such arguments 
against tradi tional--abs.olutistic--theism as contained in 
this view revolve around a logical effort to (a) make as 
maximally explicit as possible the authentic meanings con-
tained in the proposition "God is love," by empirically 
establishing that meaning of the term "love" which alone 
gives it coherent signification; (b) test the concepts 
of theism and surrelativism in terms of the meaningful 
categories established in the prior analysis. As it 
results in the course of inquiry, it is found that 
absolutistic theism not only fails to make the proposition 
"God is love" basically intelligible, but in giving it an 
wholly absolutistic interpretation, makes an impossible 
doctrine out of it, whether evaluated on logical, empirical 
or on any other scientific grounds. For instance, in one 
succinct passage in the Divine Relativity, Hartshorne reveals 
1. _T.DR, 48. 
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the basic dilemma, if not contradiction, of traditional 
theism, in relation to the question of divine love: 
If, then, God is wholly absolute, a term but never a 
subject of relations, it follows that God does not 
know or love or will us, his creatures. At most, we 
can say only that we are known, loved, and willed by 
him. Here all analogy fails us. 'I am loved by you, 
but it is untrue that you love me'--does this strange 
combination of words mean1anything, even if we suppose them addressed to deity? 
If love involves sensitivity to the joys and sorrows 
of others, sharing others' interests, and, in addition, if 
it entails growth in some direct proportion to the growth 
of others, then love so conceived is impossible in the 
view of theism, since individuals cannot infect God with 
their happiness and sorrow--since he is cause of everything 
and effect of nothing. 11And our joys can add nothing to 
the immutable perfection of God's happiness." 2 Tn 
traditional religious discourse, we speak of "serving" 
God, but such is pure theological jargon if in reality 
God is beyond the place where human acts can have any 
affect upon him. Also, "to love," it is said, 11 is to 
wish to give rather than to recteve"; but if God is 
totally 
love of 
1. TDR, 
2. MVG, 
impassive, 
God one is 
16. 
114. 
nonreceptive being, then in the human 
prohibited from seeking to give, which 
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makes love a curious at'fair of loving a being who requires 
no love. Wherein lies the reason for loving if the object 
of that love is a wholly independent and self-sufficient 
being , who requires nothing . and asks nothing of the subjects 
of that love? On such terms, that is, traditional theism, 
love assumes the character of blind obligation, under which 
man must love God since his religious creed authorizes it--
e. love which for all purposes of human experience is 
meaningless. 
These are but a few of a host of criticisms which may 
be directed against this type of theism and its concept 
of divine love. Beneath all of the criticisms which can be 
made, there exists one fundamenta~ objection common to all: 
that in conceiving God as totally absolute being, one denies 
him a social nature, a denial which makes it impossible to 
understand not only how such basic religious beliefs as 
"God is love" can have coherent empirical meaning, but, 
in addition, aside from purely religious or theological 
questions, how in strictly metaphysical terms we can 
understand God and man to be actively related. 
CHAPTER V 
THE DIVINE THEME 
1. The Divine Creator and the Human Artist 
An esthetic conception of God which views him merely 
as form, form-without-content, is a lifeless and empty 
one. "The cosmic art is the content-with-the-form, the 
form-with-the-content." 1 The content which fills out 
the form is produced both by the creative acts of God and 
the creative acts of man. Every esthetically vibrant item 
in the divine being has rich social meaning since it has 
within it all of the ingredients of human artistry. Divine 
beauty is a composite of divine traits and human creative 
patterns, growing as the divine nature attains greater 
perfection and as human art achieves larger esthetic 
dimensions. 
Both God and m.an occupy the role of artists--with an 
unfinished task--as both enjoy the ever-fresh experience of 
exploring new areas of value, producing fresh novelties, 
and by creating new varieties, thereby adding to the 
beauties of existence. God participates as the Artist 
among artists, analogous to a musical director, who through 
his artistic skill commutes to others that technical item 
that he has previously mastered. But God is not the totally 
1. MVG, 226. 
superior Artist, who has accomplished all skills and 
realized all artistic values, insofar as human individuals 
in their inferior capacities as creative agents can and do 
bring new values into existence, that is, values that were 
prior to that point, literally not in existence either for 
God or man. In terms of sheer control over materials, God 
and man share an equal power, but God is superior in his 
art. uHe knows how to set the limits within which. the 
living units of his work are to control themselves, to do 
as they happen to please, not precisely as even he could 
foresee." 1 
Thus there is real novelty, real contingency, and 
hence, there is genuine tragedy as well as comedy in the 
world. This is to say that there is not simply pseudo-types 
of tragedy which assume the appearance of reality to man, 
but which actually are illusions in the all-knowing eye 
of a divine being who enjoys nothing but absolute bliss 
' 
and harmony. "The play of the world is a tragic as well 
as comic play, for players and for playwright." 2 
1. MVG, 227. 
2. MVG, 227. 
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2. The Cosmic Pattern 
The universe is somewhat analogous to a mosaic in 
which all of the intricat ely contrasting colors and minutely 
complex patterns are woven into a delicately proportioned 
scheme, giving to the many varieties a unitary composition, 
all of the subtle variations in the constituent parts being 
expressions of one common theme. The analogy stops where 
the mosaic is conceived within a fixed frame and composed 
of clashless, changeless patterns, since the universe as 
the body of the divine personality is under constant 
qualitative expansion, in which fresh varieties are 
constantly adding to the richness of the cosmic composition, 
and throughout which change is the dominant mode, and, 
throughout which clash is as apparent as harmony. 
It is this subtle arrangement of contrasts with 
corresponding unities in an ultimate Unity that the universe 
thereby obtains the maximal beauty possible. vl1thout 
contrasts the universe would be empty monotony; without 
unity it would be a labyrinth of diversities--a virtual 
state of chaos. Hence contrasts must be held together 
in some positive relation of harmony. 
Thus viewed, every element in both the organic and 
inorganic world must be supposed to have some form of 
sentiency, since to describe the non-organic world as 
purely ttdead matter" is to suggest a fundamental 
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asymmetrical character to nature, which at once destroys 
its beauty. It is to suggest that the organic and inorganic 
world is totally dissimilar in respect to its component 
units, and that thus there exists in nature a major contrast 
without a corresponding unity. 11 Now such a contrast as 
this between living and the dead, that which has feeling 
and that which has none, is not beautif'ul.u 1 Beautiful 
c '·ntrasts are only those between positive qualities, whereas 
the contrast bet\'teen "living matter" and ''dead matter" is 
one of positive quality to negative quality, that is, 
absence of quality, and hence such a contrast cannot be 
beautiful. 
It is not only the negative character of such a 
relation that obtains between sentient organic life and 
non-sentient non-organic life which alone remains 
objectionable, but the fUndamental materialistic incom-
patibility of the view with the vital facts of experience. 
These facts may be all subsumed under one title, namely, 
drama. There is drama where there is interaction of 
personalities, of minds. For instance, so much of human 
response to the elements of the natural environment is in 
the form of empathy, in which so-called ''inanimate 11 types 
of life are endowed with some kind of sentiency, feeling-
tone. We tend to individualize and personif,y animals, 
1. MVG, 214. 
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flowers, and other non-human varieties of life. And there 
would not be that unity in contrasts if not for the belief 
that sentiency at least is a running theme throughout all 
strata of life. Note Hartshorne's following vigorous 
assertion: 
wbat I am urging is that not only would the harmony, the 
unity in variety, of the world as such be inadequately 
enjoyed were not all individuals, from electron to 
cosmos, at least sentient, but also there would not 
really be any cosmic harmony to enjoy, even by the 
human spectator. • • .Animals are fascinating because 
they are subpersonalities; electrons, because they are 
dimly envisaged as sub-subpersonalities •••• 'Nature,' 
because it is the mysterious supermind1whose thoughts are both other than and akin to ours. 
The common tendency to reject as incredible any 
description of non-human life as embodying some form of 
personality is a natural result of the limitations not only 
of human language to adequately express that which is 
radically remote from the human world, but of human science 
in gaining detailed empirical kno\'Tledge . of the remote. 
The simplicity of composition which science finds in 
non-organic structure is commonly used as an argument 
against the existence of mind or feeling in the non-organic 
world. But, then, the simplicity is not a positive quality; 
it merely means a "low degree of complexity, and hence it is 
contrasted, not to mind and feeling and will in general, but 
1. MVG, 215. 
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to complex types of mind and feeling and will. 11 1 
The greatest beauty is found in a universe composed of 
individuals from the simplest to the most complex types who 
possess some capacity for feeling, some 11mind. 11 "Then we 
have immense but positive contrasts between the various 
levels and kinds of mind and feeling." 2 
From what has been said it should not be inferred that 
no esthetic value attends the contrast between the personal 
and impersonal. There is esthetic value to such contrast 
as it occurs between and within personalities. This is to 
say, that the contrast, for instance, between an individual 
in group A and group B as such may be of an impersonal or 
''unpersonal 11 character and yet have esthetic value, since 
personality is the common denominator in the contrast, even 
though the member may clash with the group (or individual 
in that group) in virtue of his identification with the 
exclusive interests of his O'\ffl group (such which creates 
the "unpersonal 11 relation). 
Unities bind varieties into rich and harmonious life 
patterns, but the ultimate unity, which, indeed, binds all 
unities together must be conceived as an expression of a 
single pattern. And the only pattern conceivable is that 
constituted by divine love, which in its maximally adequate 
1. MVG, 214. 
2. MVG, 214. 
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way reaches out and into all forms of life, sympathetically 
a ppreciating the joys and sorrows of' every individual. 
Likewise all contrasts must be expressions of some 
universal scheme--variations on a common theme. For atheism 
the universal theme is matter in motion, but as this includes ! 
only the structural aspects. of' process and not the 
qualitative, and since the contrast .between qualities and 
structures is "esthetically positive," the theme therefore 
lacks genuine universality. "Simply to add to the 
structural aspect of matter the qualities we kno~T is not 
to explain the unity of relations and qualities." 1 The 
unity that can be found to place relations and qualities 
into ordered connections is that unity of experience as 
sue~, which is essentially social. And the only unity 
which can adequately serve as a universal theme, of which 
all contrasts are but variations, is the unity of an all-
embracing loving God, whose omnisc.ient sympathy enters 
into every unit of existence and circumscribes all qualities 
and relations. 
1. MVG, 217. 
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3· Divine Personality as the Cosmic Theme 
"Since the beautiful must contain contrast, it is 
necessary that there be variety, multiplicity, in God as 
that there be unity. n 1 If God is denied these attributes, 
which necessarily includes that of change, then not only 
is God deprived of contrast within himself, which without 
contrast he lacks beauty, but he thereby lacks unity, and 
consequently his relation to the world lacks beauty. 11For 
if this relation is to be beautiful, then, in spite of the 
infinite contrast between creator and creature, there must 
also be a no less profound similarity." 2 Both unity and 
contrast, or likeness and difference, between God and man 
is of infinite proportions. If man was made in His image 
then the likeness of creator to creature is in one 
definitive sense identical, but if God is maximally adequate, 
omnis_cient, in respect to certain variables in the relation, 
then the creator is infinitely dissimilar to the creature. 
That is, he is dissimilar in the sense that those variables 
that are applicable to man in a finite degree are applicable 
to God in a wholly infinite degree. But as contrast may 
entail cosmic extremes so unity may entail inrinite 
experiential proximity, which is to say that God through 
1. MVG, 217. 
2. MVG, 219. 
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sympathetic participation can exhaustively experience the 
positive qualities of 
in this strict sense, 
the human's experience, and become, 
partial-ly identical with the individual .! 
God is maximal unity and yet is the divine, and there-
f'ore exhaustive case of' all varieties, as all varieties in 
present .existence; for there are values till to be realized 
and hence new varieties to be produced. Each new personality 
brings into the world some unique variant in attitude and 
feeling-tones and thus contributes a new item to the divine 
experience. And insofar as there is the creative unique 
human personality, which by its singular contributions add 
to the multifold varieties of the world, and insofar as 
God is both a creative and receptive participant in human 
lif'e, does every human act whereby some new value is brought 
into existence add to his nature and enrich the esthetic 
dimensions of his life. And, conversely, every divine act 
which gives birth to a new value, an additional item of 
beauty, in an even greater and richer measure, adds to the 
depth of human personality and to the life of the universe 
as a whole. 
God grows as additional values comeinto existence, 
but he grows from one maximum to another maxmum since at 
each instant he is the supreme case of all value, as "all" 
is understood to mean "all that so f'ar is. 11 
In one of Hartshorne's lyrical passages God is 
I 
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described as the ttcosmic adventurerr• who is the integrater 
of all 11real adventures as they occur." "Who is literally 
the younges.t and the oldest of all beings, the richest in 
accumulated experiences, and consequently the most equipped 
with suitable background for diverse new ones." 1 
Once again, as with the other aspects of the divine-
human relationship, God possesses an ultimate esthetic 
adequacy, whereas man possesses a limited esthetic adequacy, 
since the latter has capacity for experiencing only a 
fractional crossection of feelings and qualities, and there-
fore of value, and the former has omniscient capacity for 
experiencing every feeling and quality in the universe, to 
the point of their occurence. Thus by the very nature of 
God's omniscient capacities for esthetic experience, his 
ability to absorb more and more varieties proportionally 
increases, and hence he progresses from one maximal state 
to another. Since C-od's "starting point" is always at the 
level of omniscient experience of value, and man's always 
at the finite level, it necessarily follows that man's 
esthetic development will lag by an infinite degree. But 
onlylin this sense of degree of esthetic experience, that is, 
including an awareness of all value at a given point of 
time, is the relation one of infinite to finite. God's 
development cannot run away with itself into cosmic futures 
MVG, 227-28. 
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since that development is dependent upon the creation of 
values on t h e human level, and, also, simply upon creation 
of fUture values by God or other beings. And since values 
not yet discovered either by God, man or other beings 
deprive that much richness from the divine being , his 
development is thus kept short of achieving a wholly 
11 finished 11 or "absolute" state of fulfillment. 
Thus divine love is the only theme that can explain 
how different segments of life can so radically clash and 
yet remain components of a positive social structure, and 
that can make possible an ultimate social relation between 
not only the divine pers.onali ty and human personalities, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
, I 
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but between the divine personality and sub-human personalities. 
For. divine love is the omniscient response to every feeling 
of every unit on all levels of existence. It is that fluid, 
immediate awareness that grasps every element of life in its 
every -pulsat ion. It is the irreducible divine common 
denom i nator in terms of which all contra sting forms of lif e 
find their common relation. As each unit in its particular 
scale represents some special unificat ion of contrasts, and 
as units on higher scales circum scribe more contrasts and 
entail greater integration, so the universe as the maximal 
aggregate of living units requi res the highest being con-
ceivable for its integra.tion, and . such a conceivable being 
is one endowed with omniscient love. 
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An electron is a principle of unity-in-contrast on a 
very small scale, or over a negligible portion of space. 
An atom is a unification of greater contrasts, covering 
a larger area. A man is the unity of the region occupied 
by his body. Thus the higher types of being integrate 
more of the variety of the world. Only the highest 
conceivible being could integrate the universe as a 
whole. 
And Hartshorne concludes: 
The way to find the most unity in the world is to see it 
as the expression of a single plan, and the only such 
plan conceivable is the love of God for the various 
forms of life and feeling •••• Thus the divine as love 
is the only theme adequate to the cosmic symphony. 2 
1. MVG, 216. 
2. MVG, 216. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY 
The extreme materialistic view that all activity is non-
sentient and non-purposive is so completely at odds with man's 
common experience as to require no~aaborate refutation. The 
more plausible alternative to this view is the one which 
defines some activity as sentient and purposive, and other 
activity as not. But even this alternative view is shown 
to be at odds with the latest theoretical developments in 
physics and esthetics. Panpsychism, as an alternative to 
dualism, proves more satisfactory in its explanation of mind 
and matter and their mutual relations, and includes a much 
more metaphysically inclusive, empirically grounded view of 
nature. 
Panpsychism is based on the notion that all organic re-
lations may be plausibly explained in terms of the category 
of feeling. And it is within this frame of reference that 
Hartshorne develops hie analysis. 
Hartshorne's analogical scheme provides appropriate 
grounds for developing an empirically coherent social concept 
of divine relations. The scheme consists of the mind-body 
and social constructe, and the unified construct. The mind-
body construct is a development of the experiential relation 
between mind and body in a given individual. It contains two 
aspects: 1) The quality of immediate awareness; 2) The specific 
=====!~,... --.··· .. 1 """;\ •• 
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range of control which the individual exercises over his 
thoughts and actions. The mind-body relation empirically 
reveals both the character of cognitive immediacy and direct 
volitional control. 
The social construct finds its basis in inter-subjective 
sympathy. This is the dynamism of sociality. Sociality is 
interaction, and interaction is impossible without the 
capacity of social beings to gain a reciprocity of feeling 
and an appropriate perspective of the mental disposition of 
each other. 
The unified construct combines the principles of 
immediacy and sociality ~~to a more inclusive analogical 
equation. Thus, the relation between mind and body is placed 
into a social context, and the relation between minds is 
endowed with immediacy. 
The preceding analogical scheme makes possible a 
plausible empirical analysis of divine attributes, in terms of 
the social aspects which define those attributes. The 
appropriateness of the mind-body and social constructs for 
formulating on analogy a meaningful concept describing divine 
relations is, according to Hartshorne, adequately grounded on 
such considerations as the following: 1) God must be con-
ceived as a Mind communicating with minds; . 2) as a Divine Will 
actively initiating change; 3) as a being possessing 
omniscience; 4) as a being possessing the capacity to com-
municate immediately with minds without destroying the 
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individuality of persons. 
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Deductions from the analogies, with respect to the 
problem of divine cognition and volition, disclose such 
observations as the following: The difference between God's 
consciousness and the individual's consciousness is one of 
guantity, we know only in part, God knows all. God's 
cognitive pO\vers have identical qualitative immediacy, but 
maximal extensity. Divine cognition is absolute or non-
relative since it is merely a vehicle for divine knowledge. 
God's immediacy holds for every constituent of reality and 
hence his cognitive knowledge is entirely denotable by an 
internal relation of knower to things known. 
The idea of sympathy between mind relations and mind-
body relations, expanded to cosmic scale, finds its highest 
meaning in a Divine Mind . embracing the world-body through 
, . 
sympathetic relations, asserting its power and volition in 
and through the subjects of these relations. 
This analysis .. is based on the argument that divine 
cognition, volition and causal determination can be explained 
without contradiction only if we are able to establish those 
aspects of the divine nature analogously on relations given in 
human experience. 
The implications of these deductions for an ethical 
1 
i 
I 
evaluation of divine nature constitute a significant case 11 
against the divine absolutism of traditional theism; In this ~~ 
view the ethical relation between God and human individuals 1s 1j 
,.,· . 
of a kind in which genuine sociality is absent, since God and 
man stand at cosmic extremes on the scale of existence. Hence 
it fails to give an intelligible account of the ethical 
dynamics of divine love. Hartshorne's conception--"surrela-
tivism"--of divine nature · attempts to impute genuine social 
meaning into the idea of divine love~ : bY conceiving God to be 
sympathetically related to every individual. Hartshorne 
attempts to demonstrate that insofar as love in its ge:nti.ine 
sense is not fiction, but a factual and necessary component 
of motivation in a social context, are we able to derive the 
basic concept adequate to a divine instance. If on the human 
level love is not merely self-seeking but essentially includes 
interest in others, then to a maximally greater degree can 
we conceive divine love in such qualitative terms as 
embodying the highest instance of inclusive social partici-
pation. 
Some observations on the nature of divine love are the 
following: Divine love in the meaning of sensitivity is 
absolute, absolute in terms of maximal cognitive sufficiency 
and experiential participation in the human situation. Divine 
love as rapport and concern for the individual in his 
immediate situation, is maximally adequate, but inasmuch as 
this love has a relati.onal function, since it is genuinely 
social, it is qualified by that function and therefore is 
itself relative. 
An esthetic conception of God which views him merely as 
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form, form-without-content, is a lifeless and empty one. A 
more adequate conception describes content and form within a 
unity. The content whiCh fills out the form is produced bpth 
by the creative acts of God and the creative acts of man. 
Divine beauty is a composite of divine traits and human 
creative patterns, growing as the divine nature attains 
greater perfection and as human art achieves larger ~sthetie 
dimension. Both God and man occupy the role of artists--
with an unfiniShed task--as both enjoy the ever-fresh 
experience of exploring new areas of value, · producing fresh 
novelties, and by creating new varieties, thereby adding to 
the beauties of existence. 
The universe is a vast pattern of diversities within 
unities, and the diversities within unities ultimately 
embodied in a Unity, which is God. The only unity which can 
adequately serve as a universal theme., of which all contrasts 
are but variations, is the unity of an all-embracing loving 
God, whose omniscient sympathy (love) enters into every unit 
of existence and circumscribes al l qualities and relations. 
Thus divine love is the only theme that can explain 
how different segments of life can so radically clash and yet 
remain components of a positive social structure. 
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CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
CHAPT 'fi:R I 
:METAPHYSICAL PROPOS I TIONS, ANALOGIES 
AND ErvrP IRICAL ANALYSIS 
1. A Preliminary Statement 
The view to be maintained throughout the course of this 
cr i tical analysis is briefly formulated in the following 
series of log ical postulations. 
A. 1) The intention of metaphysical propositions (not 
metaphysical categ ories) is to describe empirically 
some part or whole of reality, wheth er such description 
is embodied in "first prin ciples, 11 "cosmologies," or 
"teleologies." 
2) Metaphysical propositions are therefore empirical 
p ropositions of an extremely g eneralized and 
conceptualized type. 
B. 1) Empirical propositions must be appraised for their 
factual meaning and testability. 
2) If' factual me an ing is wholly lack ing , and direct 
or indirect testability or even the possible conditions 
u n d e r wh ich testability is conceivable are lacking , 
then the proposition is said to be empirically 
meaningless (though not necessarily "ph ilosophically" 
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meaningless). 
c. 1) As metaphysical propositions are in . some form 
empirically-scaled propositions they must pass the 
emp irical test which determines their validity. 
2) If a metaphysical proposition is found to be 
wholly lacking in factual mean ing and testability 
(direct, indirect, or conceivably possible), t hen 
it is declared empirically mean ing less. 
3) If a metaphysical proposition is found to possess 
some limited factual meaning and testability (su ch as 
tho se contained in a spe culative cosmology derived 
from scientific evidence a nd theory),then it may b e 
declared provisionally empirically meaning ful wh ile 
quali fied a s highly conJ e ctural. 
And the major conclusion: 
D. 1) Since Hartshorne 's analysis proceeds in inductive 
f ashion from a set o f metaphysical as su mptions about 
certain a spects of empirical reality and from specific 
empirical categ ories to broad metaphysical con clusions--
f ac tual--descriptive conc l u sions, the analys is is 
therefore sub.ject to the empirical test. 
2) The empirical test is not c oncerned with internal 
log ical consistency, external log ical consi s tency with 
other theocosmic systems, nor with t h e particular 
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empirical lo3 ic of the arguments presented in 
.Justifying basic relig ious aspi rations. The empirical 
test is instead concerned with the empirical adequacy, 
precision and fruitfulness of the method employed, 
with the scientific appraisal of the factual categ ories 
upon which the a nalysis is constructed (whi ch in this 
context includes only that aspect which this paper 
has examined--the divine social analysis), and with 
th~ theocosmic descriptive conclusions contained in 
the divine social theory. 
The main interest in this critique will be in apply ing 
the empirical test to Hartshorne's method--the analog ical 
method (as used in regard to th e pro olem of the divine-man 
relation), and to his empirical categ ories and conclusions. 
For purposes of clarify ing the critical procedure to be 
used here, the following sections are devoted to a brief 
exa mination of the meaning of empirical analysis , to the 
im p lic a t i ons of the empirical test for metaphysical 
proposit i ons and to a definition of analog ies. From this 
preliminary examination critical applica tions can then be 
made to the method and content of Hartshorne ' s empirical 
theory. 
It may be revealed in advance tha t the position 
presented here is one which neither arbitrar ily reJects 
or uncritica lly accepts in wholesale fashion the 
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propositions of metaphy sics. Distinctions will be made 
which cla s s ify certain type s of metaph y sical propositions 
as empiricall y meaningful and others as empirically 
meaning less, as properly understood in terms of t h e Empirical 
criterion. 
2. The Meaning of Empirical Analysis 
There are many "empirical" approaches, "empirical" 
methods, "empirical" analyses as to require initial 
qualification with regard to t h e way in whi ch t he term is to 
be used here. One provisional and rather broad distinction 
may be made bet ween "synoptic 11 emp i rical ana. lysis and 
11 lo g ical 11 empirical ana lysis. In synoptic empirical 
analysis the predisposing interest is in developing larg e-
scale s yntheses based on broad extrapolations from empirical 
data. The scope o f analysis is "synoptic, 11 that is, 
maximally i nclusive to the ext ent of available data. The 
analysis is considered to produce valid synth eses when 
i n clusive coherent r e lations are ob tained both wi thin and 
betvreen the g iven syntheses. Synoptic empirical anal ysis 
is methodologically oriented to spe cu l a t i ve t ype s y stems. 
"Log ical" empirical analy sis is distinguished from t h e 
s ynoptic form of empirical analysi s by its more rig id 
met hodolo gical delimitations, its larg er i n terest in 
met hodolo gical and criteriolog ical problems, and by its 
confinement principally to small-scale s yntheses (e. g . 
theories of perception in current e pis temological analy sis). 
Log ical empirical analysis is the theoretico-philosophical 
side of empirical analysis in its narrower, fundamentally 
non-speculative meaning . 1 
1. Synopt ic empiri c a l ana lysis may be the t heo r etico-
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Synoptic empirical analysis is typically represented in 
inductive-metaphysical systems, in '''hich 11 lower 11 syntheses 
(e. g . a concept of the self or mind) are through such 
p rocedures as analog ical reasoning , empirical extrapolation, 
converted into 11hi ~:.;her 11 syn theses (e. g . a cosmic self or 
mind), and according to which the whole system functions 
as inclusively explanator y of some elemental aspect of 
experience. Lo g ical empirical analysis is confined n o t 
only to 11 lower 11 syntheses, but, even more primary , to t h e 
e.nalytical e~ination of the basic methods by which 
~ 
knowledge may be reliably obtained, and its basic criterion 
of verification. Thi s is to say that emphasis is p laced 
on prelimi nary inquiry into the linguistic, procedural 
and verificational apparatus connected '\-vi th the formal 
construction of empirical theories. 
De limitation, not reduction, is one of the regulative 
prin ciples of log ical empirical analysis . Delimitation 
means restricting the class of meaningful expressions to 
tho se wh ich are less vague, i.e. more reliable and precise 
in their denotative reference. Reducti on levels analysis 
to some all-inclusive c ommon denominator; delimitation 
simply establishes experimental (and therefore provisional) 
limits to the rang e of meaning ful .data, actual and possible. 
philosophical side of scientific analysis in its more 
g eneral speculative meaning . 
Empirical reconstruction evolved from analysis delimited 
to more precisely defined data is itself delimited. It does 
not attain the magnitudes of cosmic description or 
explanation. Disadvantages to such restricted systems, such 
as their inability to make inclusive use of all available 
data, are counterbalanced by the advantag es of adequacy, 
~ision and fruitfulness of the knowledg e _they achieve. 
Ade quate kno-v,rledge does not imply final knmdedg e, but only 
that it is sufficient to the extent of available data, 
restricted to the most meaning fu.l data, 1 in harmon~y v.ri th 
the most reliable evidence and most plausible theories. 
Pre cise knowledg e means knowledg e that is testable, or that 
contains direct suggestions as to some possibility of test 
(e. g . the t h eory of 11 fe~back 11 mechanism as applied to 
certain phases of human behavi or). Fruitful knowledg e 
implies knovlledge that is rich in testable empirical d ata 
so that additional theories are d erivable from it and from 
which f resh hints may be g ained for more adequate approaches 
to the g iven problem. .Adequate, precise, and fruitful 
knowledge is simply knowledg e tha t not only capably 
describes and explains some phase of a problem a t a g iven 
1. "Mean ing ful data 11 are data ivhich contain denotative 
and connotative meanin;:r. in some combination--the fuller 
the combination the more meaningful are the data (e. g . 
the data of esthetic experience as contained in some 
immediate value-enjoyment). 
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point of inquiry, but opens nevi avenues for broad er and 
more ade quate description and explanation . 
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3· Ivietaphysical Propositions and 
the Criterion of Factual Mean ing 
In discussing the criterion of factual meaning 
Professor Herbert Feigl alleges that .m etaphysics has not one 
but several distinctive meanings , and on the basis of t h is 
belief constructs a rather useful classifi cation . In this 
classification metaphysi cal propositions are divided into 
fi v e groups: Intuit ive, Deductive, Dial&tic~l, 
' 1 ltl. 
Transcendental, and Inductive. For Feig l only those 
p ropositions contained in inductive metaphysics have any 
mean ing , and then with qualification. 
Conjectures regarding the heat - death of the universe, the 
orig in of li f e, and the future of evolution may be 
perfectly meaning ful. But a nyone with even a super-
ficial a cquaintance with sc ientific method will realize 
h o'\"7 uncertain and vague these guesses must be. • • • 
Inductive metaphysics is thus mer~ly the risky , sanguine, 
d isreputable extreme o f science. 
I nductive metaphysics is a t best conj e ctural t o some 
g reater or lesser degree, although this writer is not 
inc l ined to define it as the "sanguine, d isreputable 
extreme o f science." 
Deductive metaphysics is guilty of t he rat ionalistic 
practice of deriving specific factual conc l usions from a 
1. Fe i g l, TCP, 384. 
2. TCP , 385. 
88 
few, extremely g eneral, and very frequently entirely vague 
premises. Dialetical metap4ysics (Fei g l especially refers 
to the Hegelian) commits the err or of confusing x history 
wi t h log ic: " ( Dialetical Me taphysics) confuses what may --
most charitably interpreted--appear as a p sy ch olog ical 
thought-movement or as a f orm of h i s t orical processes with 
t h e lo g ical forms of inference. u 1 I ntuitive metaphysics 
mi s t akes having em experience for knowing somethJng about 
it . I t is al so inherently insens itive to the distincti on 
between pictorial and emotional appeals and fac tual 
meaning . Finally, transc e ndente,l metaphysics., in attempting 
to determine t he basic categ ories of t h ought and r eality 
J 
may achieve nothing more t han a highly dubious combination 
of epistemology and cosmology , whi ch then as sumes the 
name of "ontology ." Fei g l contend s that in ontology one 
finds the greatest mass o f 11 factually-meani n g less 
verbalisms." "Specula tions concerning the ' Ab s o lute' even 
if n ot entirely devoid of empirica l comp onents, g enerally 
contain an ample measure of 'absolutely' untestab1e p seudo-
propos itions. 11 2 
In t hi s classification what is definitely ascertained 
is t hat only t h os e propositions whi ch appear und er i nductive 
metaphysics may be meaning~ul and t hat propositions 
1. TCP, 385. 
2 . TCP , 385. 
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contained in the other systems are pseudo propositions, or 
are ·meaning less. Tb.is \vri ter does n ot wish to follow Feig l 
strictly on these conclusions. Instead t h is admission will 
be made: Propositions appearing under inductive meta-
physics may with v a rying probability be meaning ful, 
empirically meaningful. Certain propo s itions a ppearing 
und er any other metaphysical system may with lesser deg rees 
of v a r y ing probabi l ity be meaningful. Certain propositions 
a p pearing under all metaphysi cal sy stems may b ear 
phi l osophical meaning , 1 and some system-variants \vi thin 
t h e general systems may likewise bear philosophical meaning . 
Th e criterion of fa ctual meaning requires a term inal 
ostensive connection of exp res s ions tak en to be factual in 
intention with somet h i ng outside of the langue.ge. Any 
e xpression with factual meaning mu s t h ave reference to 
exp erience, and the correspondence which this reference 
e n tai ls must be ostensively grounded, that is , testable. 
T'ne testability of an expre ssion may b e direct or indirect, 
or simply possible, that is, provided the expression 
contains reference to conditions und er whi ch such testability 
is conceivably possible. Allowing t h is rather broad s p an 
to testability o f valid empirical statements (experiential, 
1. This refer s to theoretico-conceptual meaning which endows 
an abstract descriptive-explanatory view with a certain 
kind of logical intellig iThility. 
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operational, or experimental testability), permits 
classification of ~ propositions in inductive metaphysics 
as empirically meaning ful, although leaving others as 
empirically meaningless. An empirically meaningless 
proposition is one whose reference to a state of affairs 
carries no recognizable correspondence. If some s tat e of 
existence wh ich a statement purports to describe is actually 
not known or knowable t h en the statement is empirically 
meanins less. In Fei g l's words : "If we cannot possibly con-
ceive o f vlhat would have to be the case in order to c onfirm 
or disconfirm an assertion 1,1 e v-rould not be able to 
distinguish between its truth and its falsity ." 1 Insofar 
a s a proposition may be testable in pr inciple then some 
i nductive metaphysical p ro positions may be considered 
empirically meaningful, p rovisionally t estable (e. g . the 
t heory regarding the heat-death of the u n ive rse, or certain 
extr a - gala ctic hypotheses and theories) . But to exc l ude 
some propositions in this order as empirically meaning l e ss 
is not to make any assertion as to their "philosoph ical 
meaning ." Alexander's "emerg ent evolution" theory and 
Whitehead 1 s organic world vievf are cases in point 'ltlhere 
definitive testable empirical meaning may b e subste.ntially 
l a ck ing , but which yet p ossess si gni f icant ph ilosophical 
mean ing t hat g i ves some abstract conceptua l intellig ibility 
1. 'I'CP, 38 2. 
91 
to such systems. 
The basic vreakness of inductive metaphysical t h eories 
(particularly theories about theolog ical entities) is simply 
t h at t h ey are hi ghly conjectural and hence they are 
inadequate in t h eir descriptive-explanatory detail, t h eir 
denotative terms lack empirical precision, and they possess 
minimum fruitfulness in providing premises for the 
derivation of more adequate theories. Tnis applies to 
statements with empirical meaning in inductive metaphysics 
and even more so to other inductive metaphysical statements 
wh ich have only theoretico-conceptual (philosophical) 
meaning , although the latter expressions are already 
d etermined not to have testable empirical meaning . 
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4. Analogies as Hypothetical Guides for 
Empirical Analysis 
<. 
It is of importance for the critical analysis that 
follovis to define the function of analo 3 ies or analo gical 
reasoning , in an empirical (or even trans-empirical) system. 
At best analogies may be poor to excellent guides, hints, 
or suggestions hypothetically determining the direction some 
particular analysis is to take. At worst, analog ies ma y 
serve in creating a deceptive "false-bottom" for an 
empirical system. This 11false-bottom 11 is easily slipped 
into a system when analog ies are permitted to "run wild '~ ' 
and hypostatize every inference t hat results from tracing 
the imp lications of such analo g ies for certain initial 
assumpti ons. Properly used, analog ies may serve in 
significant ways in providing orientation for a particular 
experimental inquiry . Functional analog ies are common in 
scientific discourse, demonstrating in innumerable cases 
g reat utility in produc.ing effecti ve short-cuts for 
research, allo·wing it, in pursuing a new problem, to 
side-step who le duplications of an experimental procedure 
p rev iouE ly connected with another problem. I mproperly 
used--when analo g ies are tak en not as experimental guides 
for concep tual o r empirical construction, but as somehow 
in t h emselves direct ch annels to knowledge, or capable of 
c onfirming knowledg e--analogies become a serious detriment 
93 
to gen~inely explanatory, precise and fruitful analysis. 
Analog ies never demonstrate facts, they simply suggest 
what later may be found to be facts. Empirical facts in 
the final phase are what confirm or disconfirm analog ies. 
i 
I 
I 
,, 
Analog ies may be instrumental in developing an understanding i\ 
of a possible state of affairs, but the understandin g is of I 
a conc eptua l-anticipa.tory form which can become factually 
articula ted only v-rh en that possible state o f affairs 
becomes empirically confirmed. 
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CHAP'l'ER II 
CRITICAL APPLIC.A~PIONS TO THE METHOD AND 
CON1'ENT OJ.<"' HARTSHORNE 1 S ANALYSIS 
1. A Meth odological Criti cism of the 
Analogical Procedure 
The purpose of the precedin3 section was to define t h e 
meaning of such terms and names as "empirical analysis, 11 
11 inductive-met aphysics, 11 "factual meaning , 11 "small-scale" 
(lower) and "larg e-scale" (higher) "syntheses," "testabili t y , 
11 fruitfulness, 11 and others, since these will be used in t h e 
f ollowing s e ctions with out annotations. 
The main ob,ject of the criticism to be presented here 
is essentially expressed in th e follovling proposition: If 
through some parti cu l ar met h od employed in a g iven system 
o f analysis, conclus i ons are reached whose validity or 
invalidity cannot be det e rm ined on some basically 
exp eriential test, then that met hod is unsuitable for 
empirical analysis in that g iven system, and those 
conclusions valueless for construct i ve formulation. If 
there is no way of d et ermini n g the correspondence of a 
g iven proposition to reality, then there is no way o f 
ascertaining its validity. And if nothing can be said 
about a proposition either for its confirmation or 
d isconfirmation, t h en it is obviously useless as evidential 
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content f or the construction of empirical theory. 
In e ffec t , t h is is the charg e to be made a gainst 
Hartsh orne's analog ical procedure--with s p ec i al reference to 
hi s t h eolog ical an.s,lysis--and a gainst the various empirical-
theocosmic conclusions that issue from the application of 
this procedure. 
'I'here are two main objections to the analog ical method 
as a pro c edure for philosophical (or metaphysical) empirical 
analys is, especially of the theolo g ical type, as employed 
in Hartshorne 1 s 11 org ani c 11 theory. 1 
1) The ana log ical method is adequate . only to the deg ree 
o f detecting possibilities. Th is is directly connected with 
the fact t hat by virtue of analog ies one is able 11 to conceive' 
and not essentially 11 to know. 11 'fu i s requires that a basic 
dist inction be made between the separate activities of 
t.11 conceiving 11 and "knowing . 11 
I n some limited s e nse 11 to conceive" is "to know ~ 11 if 
by conceiving one means the act of become intellectually 
aware of certain log ical or empirical possibilities within 
some pre - defined lo g ical or empi r ical frame o f reference. 
This a1.vareness is correlative to a state of 11knowing , 11 but 
only a s knowing is c onfined to the abstract category of 
1. This is to be distingu ished from scientific empirical 
analysis and its 11 small-scale synthesis" fun ctions, in 
whi ch c ontext the objections to the method of analogy do 
not parti cularly a pp ly. 
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"possibles" or 11 intellig ibles. 11 Knmlfing in this sense does 
not attach to verifiable knowledg e, but to the logical 
p ossibility of verifiable knowledg e. In it s more basic 
meaning "to know" or "knowing" means having knowled g e of 
some directly or indirectly verifiable aspect of 
experience . In terms o f the criterion of factual meaning 
to k now is to assert that that which is known is in some 
fashion empirically testable; whereas to conceive is to 
reveal primarily that a g iven item is possible for thought . 
Hence to conceive is to apprehend log ical or existential 
possibilities ; to know is to establish certainties under 
some principle of empirical c onfirmation. 
Analog ies and analos ical procedure are devices whi ch 
i mplement the apprehen sion of "conceivable 11 possibilities 
- J 
a n d not 11knowable" actualities. In opening his chapter 
on Theological Analop;ies, Hartshorne remarks: "The RELATION 
o f God to the world must necessa rily be conceived , if at 
all, by analogy with relat :i. ons g iven in human experience . 11 1 
Th is admission that God's relation to the vwrld is to be 
conceived (but not known) t hrough analogy is precisely the 
point to be established here: A. metaphysical analysis if 
it is to be genuinely empirical, must primarily deal with 
k n owables and not c onceivables, but the very nature of the 
analog ical method precludes such analysis from going beyond 
1 • IvJ:VG, l 7 4. 
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the category of conceivables, and thus metaphysical analysis 
, cannot be effectively "empirical'' if it operates solely 
through that method. And if the method of. analogy not only 
restricts ana lysis to conceivables or possibles, but 
provides no means for confirming them, then the analysis 
and t he conclusions in vlhich it issues cannot reliably 
serve as a premise for empirical reconstruction. 
2) As previously stated, analog ies never demonstrate 
facts, they simply suggest possibilities. P~d this j 
observation provides the grounds for the second objection, I 
namely that the extrapolation which tak es place under t h is 
method, especially where descriptive theological content 
is involved, does not entail g enuine description. There is 
a peculiar circularity involved here, since in the 
formulation of theolo gical concepts "ultima te" features of 
reality are involved, features vlhich by their very "ultima.cy" 
defy, even in principle , some type of confirmat ion, tha t is, 
testability. 
Extrapolation from selective aspects of human 
exp er i ence may g ive elaborate extension and detail to 
theological assumptions, but, and here is both the fact of 
circularity and non-testability, such ext r apola tion 
accomplishes little more than to complete the "circuit of 
analogy ." The procedure is simple, and if not watched, 
deceptive in the c onclusions that follow (stated in ~ 'fQ.r.-.s 
98 
of Hartshorne's analysis): Some theolog ical assumption 
serves as a center of reference (e. g . "God is love 11 or 
"Man is created in the imag e of God "); some aspect or 
a s pects of htrnan experience are selected to serve as 
analogical starting p oints in terms of which the assumption 
is to be worked through (mind-body, mind-mind relations); 
working through frorn . the analog ies results in the formation 
of some hypothetical c onstruct (divine-man relations); and 
finally in support o f its "experiential va lidity" appeal 
is made to the initial gr ounds , the ana log i es , established 
in h uma n experience. 
Several facts are reveal e d here: 1) This represents 
a typ ical case of inductive-theocosmic (metaphysical) 
analysis, wh ere rapid progres sion is made from "small-scale" 
s yntheses (mind-body, mind-mind r e lations) to "larg e-scale 11 
s ynthe ses ( theocosmic relations) , and wh ere the 
"ultimacies" contained in the l arg e-scale syntheses preclude 
test. 2) The extrapolations f rom analog ies, formulc,ted 
in terms of the hypothetical constructs are hypothe tice.l 
and pseudo-descript ive. If they describe some speci f ic 
tre,its in a Divine Being (omniscience, immediacy, etc . ), 
~ot 
t he se are~ knowable since they exceed even the most indirect 
and nrovisional test of emp irical analysis. 3) The analysis 
p ossesses circularity and hence sterility of informative 
content. The empirical con c l usions about deity are simply 
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explanation, which Feig l characterizes as decep tive 
explanation: " I t has orily the external form of 'real 
explanation'." 1 
Continuing with this cri tic ism , from the point of vie\v 
o f log ical empirical analysis, there are several addition al, 
and more specific, objections to Hartsh orne's method and 
analog ically d e rived theory. 
The marks of usefUl empirical analysis are its adequacy, 
precision, and fruitfulness . At t each of these points 
Hartshorne's theory is deficient. · It fails at adequacy 
since the "knowledge" the t h eory supplies about the reality 
under analysis, i.e. deity, is altog ether based not only 
on insufficient evidence, but on all hi g 1ly indirect, that 
is, e.nalo gical, evidence. Adequa te k nowledg e i mplies 
knowledg e sufficiently based on all ava~lable , direct 
experiential data relevant to that vrh ich t he k novrledg e is 
about. But questions of 8.dequacy a re not qui te rel evant to 
an analysis based on the method of analo gy , when t hat meth od 
is n ot paralleled b y other more direct methods . Analysis 
1Horked through t h is method may be described as e.n 
i nferen tial "p ole vault" that never seems "to clear the bar" 
but invari ably l ands back on the same g round it started 
1. RPA, 512. 
I 
from. Analogical . ''knowledge" is adequate only "unto itself," ,I 
and not to the extent of the evidence available regarding 
the phenomenon to be known, since, as is the case, no such 
evidence is offered 
The theory. fails in achieving some· precision in its 
I 
I 
II 
II 
descrip-tions, which is a defect directly attributable to its 
lack. o.f . testability, e .i ther direct or in principle. Preciaion I 
in description, in its . simplest . t .erms, means that the, terms 
of descript.ion reasonably correspond to or are conmeasurably 
supported by factual elements in the reality under descrip-
tion, .2l: that .. the description defines the conditions under 
which . its .terms . correspondent . wi.th the reality described 
may be verified. In either . case Hartshorne 1 s theory lacks 
' precision. Statementsabout d.ivine omniscience and volition, 
or any statement.s · about . a divine existent . and divine 
attributes elude the questionof descriptive precision since 
that which cannot even be .detec.ted cannot be examined, and 
hence questions about the degree of correspondence such 
statements have to reality are fruitless. 
And finally the theory is not fruitful, which . is 
explainable on its previous deficiencies. A fruitful 
theory is one that abounds in empi.rical data, out of which 
additional explanatory content, c.omplementary hypotheses 
and. reconst.ructions may be. derived. 
The criticism has pointed out . the general defici.ency 
of empirically descriptive content of Hartshorne's theory, 
I 
I 
I 
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the steri lity of the conclusions and their unavoidab le 
circule.ri t y . This deficiency stems both from the method of 
e,nalogy, used in the context of metaphysical analy sis, and 
from t he dilemmatic character of theolog ical metaphysics 
itself. The "absolute, 11 11ultimate , 11 "maxima l ly-embodied 11 
traits o f a de ity may have s om e intellig ible meaning for 
one disDosed to define and reason about deity in an 
analog i cal manner, or for one wh o is spea1dng with 
metaphorical intent and who openly admits the non-literal ity 
of h is statements, but other t han t h is, what den otable 
mea n ing can discourse about deity have? The dilemma 
confronting such discourse, when tak en as serious philoso-
phical analysis, is si ·: ply that the realities described 
cannot be d etected experientially , and consequently the 
i mpossibility of kn~w.ing ·whether or not such realit i es are 
in fact rea lities malces further discussion about t h em 
fru itless. No e.t t empt can b e made to clarify, articula te, 
make more precise the descript ive statements about affirmed 
divine realities, since there is no testable empirical 
evidence to work from, on l y a nebulous range of 
p ossibilities. Interpretations which can be g iven of deity 
and his traits are limited only by the rules of log ic 
imposed internally, or by an 11 emp irical log ic 11 arbitrarily 
I 
I, 
II 
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the basis of some specific set of empirical assumptions. 
-Outside of these restrictions, interpretations can be as 
varied and diverse as their interpreters, all perhaps 
possessing some kind of intelligibility, but at the same 
time do not remain amenable to any test necessary for 
determining which do and which do not actually contain 
elements of factual tru~. 
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2. A Scientific Criticism of the Empirical 
Assumptions of Hartshorne's System 
Aside from purely methodological objections to 
Hartshorne's procedure, and the criticisms which attach to 
the type of' propositions which that analysis produces, there 
are some fundamental objections to be revealed against certai 
empirical a s sumptions on which the analysis is based, 
especially the mind-body assumption. 
Briefly, the entire assumption regarding the immediate 
relation between volition and nervous mechanism, because of 
the gross insufficiency of data, is to be seriously questioned 
Hartshorne states: rtBy the nervous mechanism man controls 
other things; but there is no further mechanism between his 
will and the nerves themselves." 1 On this assumption 
Hartshorne attempts to explain by analogy the nature of 
Divine volition, and how through it alterations may be made 
without Divine being himself possessing physical organs. 
Aside from the question of Divine volition itself, it appears 
clear that the assumption itself still remains to be tested. 
Our entire knowledge of the physio-~urological process is 
radically limited. Sc~entific investigators are just at 
the threshold of understanding with any amount of precision 
the peripheral and least complex functions of the brain. The 
1. MVG, 179· 
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construction of some adequate theory is yet to be achieved, 
since the rapid inflow of data from the various research 
channels is introducing a wide and shifting variety of 
possibilities, both in developing -m-ethodology and in 
establishing data-analysis. All of the research activity 
in biochemistry and neurophysiology is generati.ng 
increasingly more precise t .echn.i.que.s and. bringing in 
larger quanti.ties of data. necessary for . establishing a 
knowledge-nucleus from which testable explanations may be 
d.erived. 
For instance, what will be the results in the long 
run analysis of such research projects as those involving 
electro-encephalographic measurements of brain activity, 
or from such theories as the "negative feed-back mechanism" 
theory? The future is altogether promising, but systematic 
investigation has yet. to .make. decisive inroads into the 
problem, and investi gators must proceed with the cautious 
pace, and under the exper~mental spirit, of scientific 
inquiry. 
One wonders if Hartshorne does not at points substitute 
the scientific discipline for the somewhat presumptuous 
procedure of less empirically-oriented philosophical 
analys~s, by '\'lhich the impossibility of conceiving some 
further physical connection . in a proces.s is taken to mean 
that no other physical connection does, in fact, exist. It 
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is curious that Hartshorne, without Showing the least 
hesitation or attention to empirical considerations, 
implicitly accepts the entire validity of the assumption 
that there is .an immediate ·relation between volition and 
the nervous mechanism, when it is apparent that neither 
science or philosophy is clear as to what even the most 
ba sic connection is between volition and the nervous 
system, by which interaction is made possible. The fact 
that the mind-body problem can be handled in so many 
different ways is indicative of the entire vagueness of the 
data relating to t hat problem at present. 
The present difficulty 1n arriving at any definite 
conclusions on t his matter $ould be apparent.. If we are 
even unable to explain. the nature of the synapse, the point 
at which neural energy passes from one neuron to another, 
presumably, is it not exceedingly risky to draw categorical 
conclusions on . the terminal relation between volition and 
the nervous system? Certainly we cannot assert that the 
latt er is less complex than the former, or that we have 
more knowledge about the latter than the former. 
Hence, if the assumption is to be judged in terms of 
the criterion of empirical adequacy, it must be judged as 
based simply on grossly insuff icient . evidence, and insofar 
as the mind-body analogy in part rests upon it, it must be 
judged, accordingly, as having insufficient empirical basis. 
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In like manner manner must we judge all empirical 
explanations following from it, since empirical explanations 
if based on insufficient empirical . grounds--below the level 
of minimum sufficiency--cannot be verified and therefore 
they are not genuine explanatio.n. 
The same . criticism may be. levelled against Hartshorne 1 s 
conclusions. conc-erning .cognitive immediacy. Knowledge of' 
the basic functions involved in cognitive immediacy is not 
sufficiently developed to allow us to make any easy 
inferences of the fundamental kind Hartshorne .makes, in his 
attempt to understand the nature of Divine cognition. Once 
again, it seems to be presumptuous and intellectually 
careless analysis to use any assumption related to functions 
of which we have but little knowledge, as some overall basis 
for establishing an explanation of Divine attributes. 
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CHAPTER. I II 
.HARTSHORNE'S CRITICISM OF 
TilE LOGICAL POSITIVISTIC CRITICISM 
1. The Anti-metaphysical Revolt and 
the New Metaphysics 
. Logical positivism--within whose general outlines the 
preceding 11 logico-empirical 11 analysis hasbeen conducted--
has since its inception in the 11Viennese cirele 11 stood in 
open revolt to metaphysics. But this revolt .has . been 
characteri stically against an earlier metaphysics, which 
interestingly enough,_ has in many of its essential aspects 
found rejection in the new metaphysics, or else exists 
today in an atmosPhere of precarious repute. In 
Hartshorne's words: "It is notable, however, that this 
I 
school (logical positivism) takes its examples of metaphysica 
and theological doctrines chiefly from the past, or :rrom 
reactionary metaphysics of today. 11 1 Logical positivism's 
reaction has totally neglected (side-stepped?) panpsychism, 
naturalistic theism, and . the 11 scienti.fically motivated" 
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systems of 1:\i~rce, Whitehead., Stern, \'len zl, and Montague, L/ 
and it is these systems which constitute in major measure the 
the content . of the new metaphysics. 
1. BH, 253. 
The positivists claim to have refuted all metaphysics 
in principle, but the metaphysicians -make- the same , claim 
against positivism. Positivists -insist that the whole 
weight of science is behind its movement, but the ne-w 
metap~sicians. also insist that some of their most out-
standing leaders are sensitively oriented to the spirit and 
method of science, as, for instance, Leibniz, Peirce, and 
Whitehead. An obvious impasse exists here, one which 
eventually will have to be resolved. 
Sooner or later it will be necessary to meet the issue 
head on, and this means that knowledge of current 
metaphysics. and of current antimetaphysics will have 
to be combined in the minds of at least a few 
students. 1 
Although positivists are .extremely careful in drawing 
distinctions between the principles of their position and 
those of the older positivisms, they show no scruples in 
loosely generalizing about metaphy.sicians and metaphysical 
/ 
systems, or in distorting or miscontrujrlng the genuine 
aims of metaphysics. For instance, Carnap accuses 
metaphysics of attempting to discover some antecedent 
re.ali ty behind the objects of empiri.cal science, to 
determine essences, first causes. Hartshorne . repliesthat 
the real aim of metaphysics is to determine the most general 
features of phenomena. At least, . scientific metaphysics, 
:'· 
1. BH, 254. 
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as Hartshorne names 1 t, is guided solely by this aim. 
"Scienti:fio metaphysics is · the search •••• for the most 
.general traits of phenomena as yielded by abstraction 
from all imaginably variable details of experience·." 1 Its 
specific concern with vague2 as well as distinct aspects of 
experience gives it a working value which neither 
t{l 
positivism!Xor science can, by its inherent interests, have. 
It is Hartshorne's belief that both positivists and 
metaphysi.cians . must become acquainted with the subtle and 
intricate novelties o.f each other•' s system, if fair and 
effective arguments are to be waged against either system. 
It is obvious, he contends, that if logical positivism is 
to maintain a sustained reaction against metaphysicswhich 
is both relevant and significant, it must "come up to date" 
with respect to the new, scientifically-scaled, logically-
worked-through metaphysical , theories present in such 
outstanding contemporary systems as Whitehead's. 
1. BH, 269-70. 
2. Vague aspects of experience are marked by such things 
as the vaguer phenomena of emotion, memory, dim 
anticipation, esthetic harmony and discord (,. 267). 
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2. The Problem of Empirical Verification 
and the New Metaphysics 
Hartshorne contends logical positivism remains yet 
under the influence of a "sensationalist emphasis." 1 Its 
criterion of empirical verification is adequate to the 
extent of testing ''spettal truths,'·' the kind revealed in 
physics, but excludes the evidence necessary for supporting 
"general · truths, 11 such as the general principle of physics 
which asserts prediction to be possible. . Direct or 
indirect testing, as positi.vism would define it, is solely 
a function of sense-observation, and this is clearly 
necessary for establishing. the validity--determining the 
empirical meaning--of special . .(non-metaphysical) 
propositions, but so defined, excludes the. more general 
propositions which must be grounded on the vaguer data of 
r')O{ 
experienc.e, data which are~ immediately revealed through 
sense-observation. 
The new metaphysics gives critical attention both to 
the distinct and the vague data of experience, and, 
accordingly, proportionally extends the positivistic 
criterion of empirical verification to cover the data of' 
memory, emotion, anticipation, and esthetic perception. 
Frequently deficiencies in scientific and philosophical 
theory result from a whole neglect of vital, even if 
1. BH, 267. 
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indistinct ·, evidence in the publicly undemonstrable areas 
of experience. For instance, in Hume's theory of causation: 
Hume' s famous failure to find any causal bond between 
successive events is due to his failing to consult 
the character of the very data by which the idea of 
succession is made possible, that is, immediate 
memory and anticipation. . 
The issue here seems to be clear with regard to the 
re spe c.t i ve de fini t i one po si ti vi sm and the new metaphysics 
gives to the principle of empirical test. The new 
metaphysics grants the fundamental fUnction .sense-
observations have . in the det.ermination of special truths, 
but does not accept these observations -as the only source 
of critical data, particularly where . the determination of 
general truths is concerned. If logical positivism is 'bo 
insist that only those propesitions are meaningful which 
can be tested by this type of observation, then not only 
are many of the propositions of even the new metaphysics 
to be rejected, but the fundamental pre-suppositions of 
science, formulated as regulative priny{lples {general 
truths) should be declared meaningless • 
. 
When pe~~ivists ask if a certain proposition has 
meaning which might. be conceivably verified, they mean in 
general terms, if that proposition can be supported by 
corresponding sense-observations, and in particular terms, 
1. BH, 267 • 
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if it implies any factual predict.ions. Now, _ Hartshorne 
asserts, the new m.etaphysics has . fundamental propositions 
which imply an infinity of such pred.ictions. For example, 
the proposition which .follows impl.ies such predictions 
since it implies panpsychism: 11 'The universe is div.ine,' 
is the supremely integrated conscious organism. 11 1 
Hartshorne further asserts: 
It implies panpsychism, which, in conjunction w.ith 
the facts of science, is an inf.inite class of 
predictions, none .demonstrably incapable of 
verification, although perhaps none is adequat21Y 
.verifiable in the present state of knowledge. 
The class of verifiable assertions cannot be 
restricted to the class of publicly verifiable assertions, 
since it is a fa-ct of experience that there is a form of 
private verification \1hich carries equal claim with public 
verification. These are assertions which refer to the 
psychic in its most immediate, private . aspe.ct .• . The facts 
,._,hich such assertions _ describe are called by Hartshorne, 
"significant facts," and their verification, "significant 
verification." 3 11The statement, 'This pain is getting more 
severe,' may represent what I know to be a fact, quite apart 
from any translation of the statement into behavioristic 
terms." 4 Hartshorne contends that physicalist language 
1. BH, 255. 
2. BH, 255-56. 
3· Bli, 263. 
4. BH, 263. 
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ultimately depends on the existence of private facts, 
otherwise it would be totally insufficient in describing 
any situation. 11\\t'hether or not there can be merely private 
facts, there must be genuinely private ones if there are to 
be public facts . or any meaning. 11 1 
Logical positivism's rejection of metaphysical 
propositions is apparently made from the argument that they 
contain "facts 11 which .are not publicly ver i fiable. The 
objection to this, as Hartshorne insists, is simply that 
granted such propositions include ''private11 facts., they 
still are facts ., and they are. verifiable in terms of 
private, immediate cognition, and, most importn.at, that 
it is only through the existence of such facta that 
behavi.oristic description . can in the end have adequate 
meaning. The positivistsbase their argument on the 
principle that communication is the only cognitive function 
of language • . But. Hartshorne . aaks whether or not 
communication to onesel.f is wholly non-cogni.tive. If non-
cognitive means emotive, then surely one cannot say that 
"self-communication" is non-cognitive, since the aim of such 
communication is to predict or compare one's sensations 
and emotions and not to elicit emotional states in others. 
Logical positiV'ism restricts the class o:f veri:fiable 
assertions to those relating to detailed physical knowledge_,. 
1. BH, 2~. 
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as with science; but the attention o:f metaphysics is 
focused on the "generic traits" o:f experience--memory, 
anticipation, desire, vividness, discord. 1 
The aim of meta~hysics is to generalize the generic 
traits of human experience so as to arrive at the 
generic traits of all experience and so o:f all 
possible objects of experience, to discover the 
eternal characters of the cosmos not as apart 
from cha~ge, but as the abiding :features of process 
itsel:f. 
1. BH, 268. 
2. BH, 268-69. 
115 
CHAPTER IV 
SUNMARY 
Hartshorne's metaphysical analysis must be appraised in 
terms of empirical criticism (or to distinguish it from other 
forms of empirical criticism) 11logical 11 empirical criticism. 
This is required insofar as metaphysical analysis purports to 
describe and explain factual states of affairs. Logical 
empirical cri tici.sm operates on the principle of verifiability 
--the empirical test. The empirical test is concerned with 
the empirical . adequacy, precision and frui ttulness of the 
method employed and the propositions produced. 
The criter ion of factual meaning--the principle of 
verifiability--requires a terminal ostensive connection o:r 
expressions taken to be factual in intention with something 
outside o:f the language._ The testability of an expression 
may be direct or indirect, or simply possible, that is, 
provided the expression contains reference to conditions under ! 
which such test.ability is conceivably possible. 
In view of this criterion the following observations can 
be made: The basic weakness of induct1ve metaphysical 
theories (which are agreed to carry some empirical meaning) is 
simply that they are highly conjectural and hence they are 
inadequate in their descriptive-explanatory detail, their 
denotative terms lack empirical precision, and they possess 
minimum fruitfulness in providing premises :for the derivation 
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of more adequate theorie-s. 
The function of analogies in empirical analysis is to be 
carefully qualified. Analogies never demonstrate facts, they 
simply suggest what later may be found to be facts. Properly 
used, analogies may serve in significant ways in providing 
orientation for a particular experimental inquiry. They must 
always be kept within their proper function, as experimental 
guides for empirical inquiry, otherwise they may become a 
detriment to objective analysis. 
In applying the conclusions of logical empirical analysis 
to Hartshorne's method and theory, such observations as the I 
following result: There is a peculiar circularity involved in 
the formulation of theologi-cal-analogical analysis, since in 
the formulatio~ of theological concepts ''ultimate" features 
of reality are involved, features which by their very 
"ultimacy" defy, even in principle, some type of confirmation, 
that is, testability. The extrapolations from analogies, 
developed in terms of the hypothetical constructs are hypo-
thetical and pseudo-descriptive • The empirical conclusions 
about deity are simply the empirical content of the analogies 
transposed from the "human level" to the "divine." This is a 
f'orm ot: "ad hoc" explanation which Feigl characterizes as 
deceptive explanation. 
The marks of' useful empirical analysis are its adequacy, 
precision, and fruitfUlness. At each of these points 
Hartshorne's theory is deficient. It fails at adequacy since 
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the "knowledge" the theory supplies about deity is based on 
a~l highly indirect, that is, analogical evidence. The theory 
fails in achieving some precision in its descriptions, which 
is a de~ect directly attributable to its lack of testability, 
either direct or in principle. Any statement about a diV.ine 
existent and divine attributes elude the question of 
descriptive precision since that wh i ch cannot even be 
detected cannot · be examined, and hence questions about the 
degree of correspondence such statements have to reality are 
fruitless. Finally, the theory is not fruitful, which is 
explainable on its previous deficiencies. 
Hartshorne's counter criticism of logical empirical 
criticism is based on the argument that the type of 
metaphysics this criticism successfully attacks is wholly 
unlike the metaphysics currently under formulation. Logical 
positivism--within whose general outlines logical empirical 
analysis is conducted--has, since its inception in the 
"Viennese circle'' stood in open revolt to metaphysics. But 
this metaphysics did not include panpsychism, naturalistic 
theism, and the ''scientifically motivated" systems of Peirce, 
Whitehead, Stern, a.nd Montague, and it is these systems which 
constitute the new metaphysics. 
There are many misconceptions and careless criticism of 
metaphysics. For instance, Carnap accuses metaphysics of 
attempti.:l to discover some antecedent reality behind the 
objects of empirical science. Hartshorne replies that the 
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real aim of metaphysics is to determine the most general 
features of phenomena. 
The new metaphysicsgives critical attention both to the 
distinct and the vague data of experience, and according:l:,y·, 
proportionally extends the positivistic criterion of 
empirical verification to cover the data of memory, emotion, 
anticipation and esthetic perception. 'Ihe .new metaphysics 
grants the fundamental. function sense .. observations have in 
the determination of special truths, but does not accept 
these observations as .the only source of critical data, 
particularly where the determination of general truths is 
concerned. The class of verifiable assertions cannot be 
restricted to the class of publicly verifiable assertions, 
since it is. a fact of experience that there is a form of 
private verification which carries equal claim with public 
verification. These are assertions which refer to the psychic 
in its most immediat.e private aspect. These assertions refer 
to facts which are verifiable in terms of private, immediate 
cognition, and it is only through the existence of such facts 
that behavioristic description can in the end have adequate 
meaning. The basic difference between logical positivistic 
analysis (and science) and metaphysics, is that the attention 
of metaphysics is focused on the ''generic traits 11 of experi-
ence, whereas logical positivistic analysis is focused on 
detailed assertions relating to physical knowledge. 
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ABSTRACT 
This study represents an .attempt to give an adequate 
account of the fundamental principles of Hartshorne's theory 
of God's relation to the individual. The specific problem 
centers on an analysis of the cognitive-causal and ethical-
esthetic structure of the divine relationShip. In . the 
general development of the problem, Hartshorne remains 
within the frame of reference of panpsychism. Hence a pre-
liw. inary examination is made of the basic principles of 
panpsychism, in which the basic notion that all organic 
relations may be plausibly--and empirically--explained in 
terms of the category of feeling is explicitly treated. 
Hartshorne employs an analogical procedure in 
formulating a social concept of divine relations which can, 
in its entire development, remain experientially grounded. 
The analogical scheme, set forth in detail in the basic text, 
Man's Vision of God, is in its major features reconstructed 
and explicated, and the premises thereby established for 
deriving the desired empirical deductions. The scheme 
consists of the mind-body and social tlconstructs," and the 
unified "construct." The mind-body "construct" is a 
development of the mind-body relation in its human 
experiential context. This "construct" combines the two 
basic aspects of the relation--cogn~tive immediacy and direct 
I 
volitional control. The social "construct" is a development 
of inter-subjective sympathetic relations, which constitute 
the dynamism of sociality. The unified "construct" combines 
the principles of immediacy and sociality into a more 
inclusive analogical equation, in which the relation between 
mind and body is placed into a social context, and the 
relation between minds is endowed with immediacy. 
This analogical scheme makes possible a plausible 
empirical analysis of divine attributes, in terms of the 
social aspects which define _those attributes. This paper 
describes the manifold deductions following from this 
scheme, and traces their implications for the central 
problem: The social nature of divine cognition, volition 
and causal determination, as these operate through meaningful 
ethical and esthetic relations. Hence, analogically 
conceived, God's cognitive powers are described as 
possessing identical qualitative immediacy with man's, but 
possessing maximal extensity. God's immediacy holds for 
every constituent of reality and hence his cognitive 
knowledge is entirely denotable by an internal relation of 
knower to things known. 
Hartshorne's conception attempts to impute genuine 
social meaning into the idea of divine love, by conceiving 
God to be sympathetically related to every individual. 
Hartshorne aims to demonstrate that insofar as love in its 
genuine sense is not fiction, but a factual and necessary 
component of motivation in a social context, then, in these 
terms, are we able to derive the basic concept adequate to 
a divine instance. 
Fully developed, the concept entails such conclusions 
as the following; Divine love in the meaning of sensitivity 
is absolute, absolute in terms of maximal cognitive 
sufficiency and experiential participation in the human 
situation. Divine love requires return love, as humans in 
even greater measure require return love, hence the divine-
man relation is characterized by a constitutive interchange 
of value. Hence, the conclusion describes God in that 
concrete aspect as nonabsolute, since that aspect is 
inclusively defined by relational variables. 
The final phase in the formulation of Hartshorne's theory 
concerns an explication of the divine relation with regard 
to its esthetic meanings. Three fundamental ideas in the 
esthetic interpretation are given attention: 1) God's nature 
as a composite of ~ivine and human creative acts; 2) God 
and man as artists sharing a cooperative role in exploring 
new areas of value, producing fresh novelties, and creating 
new varieties; 3) Divine love as the common unity or theme of 
which all contrasts--and unities--in the universe are but 
variations. Divine love explains how different segments of 
life can so radically clash and yet remain components of a 
positive social structure. 
The critical analysis applied in this paper to 
Hartshorne's system, its method and fundamental propositions, 
is of the "logical empirical" type. It is maintained that 
this form of criticism is required insofar aa metaphysical 
ana lysis purports to describe and explain factual states of 
affairs. Hence, on this presumption, the demand is made 
that Hartshorne's analysis must be tested by some principle 
of empirical verifiability. As the principle is formulated 
in "logical empirical 11 analysis, it concerns both the 
factual correspondence of propositions to that which they 
describe in reality, and the empirical adequacy, precision 
and fruitfulness of the method employed and the propositions 
produced. 
In this critical analysis the attempt is made to shovi 
that both the method and "theocosmic 11 extrapolations do not 
adequately pass the test of empirical verifiability. The 
criticism directed against Hartshorne's method is based on 
the following argument: If through some particular method 
employed in a given sy etem of analysis, conclusions are 
reached whose validity or invalidity cannot be determined on 
some basically experiential test, then that method is 
unsuitable for empirical analysis in that given system, and 
those conclusions valueless for constructive formulations. 
On this argument Hartshorne's method is judged and declared 
faulty in these terms. 
r 
It is shown that Hartshorne's theory is deficient in 
adequacy, precision and fruitfulness of the knowledge it 
entails. It fails at adequacy since the 11knowledge 11 the 
theory supplies s.bout deity is based on all highly indirect--
slnce it is analogical--evidence. The theory fails in 
achieving some precision in its descriptions, since that 
which cannot even be detected cannot be examined in order to 
establish the degree of factual correspondence. The theory 
is not fruitful as a result of its prior deficiencies. 
Following the section on critical analysis is a brief 
examination of Hartshorne's counter criticism of logical 
empirical criticism. The counter criticism is based on the 
argument that the type of metaphysics this criticism 
successfully attacks is wholly unlike the metaphysics 
currently under formulation. Logical positivism--'\'Tithin 
whose general outlines logical empirical analysis is 
conducted--has, since its inception in the "Viennese circleu 
stood in open revolt to metaphysics. But this metaphysics 
did not include panpsychism and other "scientifically 
motivated 11 systems, which in fact constitute the new 
metaphysics. 
Hartshorne alleges that there are many misconc.eptions 
and careless criticism of metaphysics. For instance, Carnap 
accuses metaphysics of attempting to discover some 
antecedent reality behind the objects of empirical science. 
Hartshorne replies that the real aim of metaphysics is to 
determine the most general features of phenomena. The basic 
conclus ion contained in the counter criticism is that the 
fundamental di f ference between logical positivistic analysis 
(and science) and metaphysics, is that the attention of 
metaphysics is focused on the ugeneric traits" of experience, 
whereas logical po s itiv.istic analysis is focused on detailed 
assertions relating to physical knowledge. 
